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I. Introduction
The "administrative state" evolved from the constitutional
branches' desire to shift many decisions to administrative agencies,
which were to apply expert judgment through use of speedy and informal
procedures.' Eventually, however, increasing formality beset the admin-
istrative process.2 To reverse this trend, agencies began experimenting
with alternative dispute rescolution (ADR), a diverse group of informal
procedures that typically employ private parties to resolve legal contro-
versies. 3 Federal agencies rely on these procedures to make decisions
that would otherwise be assigned to courts or executive officers. The use
of private deciders in public programs, however, raises fundamental con-
stitutional concerns, for the very legitimacy of the administrative state
rests on the nature and strength of the relationships between federal
agencies and the constitutional branches. 4 The use of ADR techniques
may lead to constitutional infirmities by overly attenuating the ties be-
1. See generally Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189,
1189-96 (1986) (discussing the historical development of regulatory agencies and the political and
economic factors contributing to the growth of the regulatory system).
2. See 4 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., lST SESS., STUDY ON
FEDERAL REGULATION: DELAY IN TIE REGULATORY PROCESS 21 (Comm. Print 1977); COMMIS-
SION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, AM. BAR ASs'N, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM
ch. 6 (1979) [hereinafter ROADS TO R-FORM].
3. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL
AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 701-860 (1987) [hereinafter
ACUS SOURCEBOOK] (describing the growing use of ADR methods in administrative agencies);
Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the Administrative Process, 1
ADMIN. L.J. 141 (1987) (same).
4. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 578 (1984) (arguing for abandonment of a "rigid separation-of-
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tween private decision makers and constitutional officers.5
In a series of recommendations, the Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS) has urged the use of ADR techniques in fed-
eral programs.6 Many ADR procedures, such as negotiated rulemaking 7
and mediation to help settle litigation,8 avoid serious constitutional chal-
lenge, because although private parties influence the agencies' decisions,
government officers retain final authority. These procedures do not dif-
fer sharply enough from other avenues of private influence on public pol-
icy making to justify constitutional distinctions. 9 Alone among the
recommended procedures, arbitration delegates decision making to pri-
vate individuals and allows only limited governmental review.10
Arbitration has always played a role in America in the resolution of
some disputes. In modern times, it enjoys widespread use in labor rela-
tions and commercial practice,' 2 because it can provide speedy and final
decisions at low cost.' 3 Arbitral schemes share certain general character-
istics, but the details vary substantially. A common trait that helps en-
powers compartmentalization of governmental functions" in favor of an analysis focusing on the
relationship between the agency and each of the three branches).
5. The Department of Justice has expressed concerns that the use of ADR techniques might
violate the delegation doctrine or might infringe the President's responsibilities to control execution.
See Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel to Stephen J. Markman (Apr. 24, 1986) (copy
on file with the author). The Department, however, has also advocated the use of arbitration to
resolve fair housing disputes. Fair Housing Amendments Act of.1987. Hearings on HR. 1158 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 454-70 (1987) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General).
6. See ACUS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 3, at 113-18; see also I C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1988) (rec-
ommending agency use of ADR techniques).
7. Negotiated rulemaking is agency-sponsored negotiation between groups interested in a con-
templated regulation. The process generates a proposal that the agency issues as a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, initiating the usual procedure for informal rulemaking. See, eg., 1 C.F.R.
§§ 305.82-4, .85-5 (1988) (containing recommendations setting out procedures for negotiated
rulemaking). See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 42-
112 (1982) (providing a detailed overview of negotiated rulemaking).
8. Mediation requires a neutral third party to provide assistance to the parties in their negotia-
tions but not to render a decision. See, eg., I C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1988) (calling on agencies to adopt
alternatives to litigation, such as mediation, if not inconsistent with their statutory authority); see
also id. § 305.84-4 (providing for negotiated cleanups and government suits to determine costs for
cleanups under Superfund).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 302-04.
10. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1988).
11. See generally Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American
Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1984) (discussing common-law arbitration in the seventeenth
century).
12. In 1984, nearly 40,000 labor, commercial, construction, and accident cases were filed with
the American Arbitration Association. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1985, at 78, 79.
13. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 189-243
(1985) (discussing arbitration's advantages in providing expert decision makers, privacy, and infor-
mality); J. MURRAY, A. RAU & E. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF




sure the acceptability of arbitration-and a primary difference from civil
trials and agency adjudications-is the selection of arbitrators through
the mutual preferences of the parties. One common method of selection
allows disputing parties to rank names on a list provided by an arbitral
organization, 14 such as the Aanerican Arbitration Association (AAA) or
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, which maintain rosters
of arbitrators and promulgate codes of ethics and procedure.15 The goal
is to select one or more private individuals having no interest in the dis-
pute, and parties often choose someone with expertise in the subject mat-
ter. The standard for decision may be a contract provision or a specified
body of law. Procedures are informal, with limited discovery and relaxed
evidentiary strictures, and the arbitrator may or may not keep a record.
The outcome is an award and, perhaps, a brief recitation of the underly-
ing facts and conclusions.'
6
Existing law authorizes or requires federal agencies to employ arbi-
tration in a variety of contexts, which fall into three broad categories for
analytical purposes. The first is money claims by or against the govern-
ment. For example, private insurance carriers arbitrate claims of Medi-
care beneficiaries for reimbursement of certain medical expenses.1 7 The
second encompasses disputes between the government and its employees,
including both the resolution of grievances under an existing law or con-
tract 8 and the determination of future contractual relations.' 9 The third
is disputes between private parties related to program administration.
Examples include claims against the "Superfund" for cleanup of toxic
wastes, 20 the ascertainment of employers' liability for withdrawal from
pension plans overseen by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,21
and the determination of compensation that a pesticide manufacturer
14. See Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 447 (1988).
15. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1985), reprinted in
R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBrTRATIOI,-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 33-40 (3d ed. 1986); CODE
OF ETHIcs FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Joint Comm. of the Am. Arbitration
Ass'n & the Am. Bar Ass'n 1977), re.printed in R. COUISON, supra, at 141-49.
16. Whether an award is explained often depends on the context: labor arbitrators usually
explain their awards and commercial arbitrators usually do not. See J. MURRAY, A. RAU & E.
SHERMAN, supra note 13, at 398.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.801-.872 (1987).
18. See generally Comment, Federal Sector Arbitration Under the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 857, 864-67 (1980) (discussing the scope of negotiated grievance arbi-
tration procedures for federal employees).
19. See 5 U.S.C § 7119 (1982); 39 U.S.C. § 1207 (1982). See generally Craver, The Judicial
Enforcement of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21 BC.L. REV. 557, 558 (1980) (noting that 27
states authorize such arbitral schemes).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b)(4) (:.982 & Supp. IV 1986); 40 C.F.R. §§ 305.10-.52 (1987), re-
voked, 52 Fed. Reg. 33812 (1987).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2641.1-.13 (1987).
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must pay for the use of another's data in obtaining federal registration.22
This Article analyzes the constitutionality of these arbitral schemes
and suggests ways of structuring them to minimize constitutional
doubts.2 3 Part II traces the increasing judicial acceptance of arbitration
as a valid dispute resolution mechanism and then discusses the values
courts have emphasized in considering arbitration outside the context of
federal programs. These values pertain to federal program arbitration,
both by suggesting reasons why courts will support it generally and by
identifying limits to its use in particular contexts. Part III briefly reviews
the public/private distinction in American law and suggests that it is
inappropriate to condemn arbitration in federal programs for the sole
reason that private persons wield some public power.
Against this background, Part IV sets out a general approach ad-
dressing the concerns raised by arbitration in federal programs. These
issues, discussed in Parts V, VI, and VII, take several forms. The use of
private deciders may violate separation of powers principles associated
with the grant of judicial power to the federal courts. Alternatively, the
informality of arbitral schemes may result in an unacceptable threat to
the due process rights of persons affected by arbitration. Finally, delega-
tion of decision-making authority may improperly intrude on executive
prerogatives. This Article concludes that if certain safeguards are
adopted, arbitration in federal programs can surmount all of these
obstacles.
II. Arbitration: An Expanding Alternative to Litigation
A. Statutory and Judicial Endorsement of Arbitration
Arbitration has not always enjoyed judicial favor. Until this cen-
tury, common-law courts refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate. 24
The courts distrusted the informality of arbitration and perceived it as a
22. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a()(1)(D)(ii) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1440.1 (1988).
23. Concerns may also arise about the existence of statutory authority for agencies to refer
matters to arbitration. The Comptroller General has sometimes been reluctant to find statutory
authority for government arbitration. See Behre, Arbitration: A Permissible or Desirable Method for
Resolving Disputes Involving Federal Acquisition and Assistance Contracts?, 16 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 66,
74-79 (1986), Braucher, Arbitration Under Government Contracts, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
473, 477-78 (1952). Controls on arbitration designed to meet constitutional concerns may also as-
sure consistency with statutory authority, because principles of fairness and accountability to execu-
tive authority are pertinent to both inquiries. The discussion that follows assumes the presence of
adequate statutory authority for any particular referral to arbitration.
24. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir.
1942); Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L.
REv. 1305, 1309-18 (1985). See generally Wolaver, The Historical Background of CommercialArbi-
tration, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 138-44 (1934) (surveying the growth in legitimacy of commercial
arbitration from the seventeenth to the twentieth century).
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threat to their own jurisdiction. 25 Justice Story captured the prevailing
view:
[A]rbitrators, at the common law, possess no authority whatso-
ever, even to administer an oath, or to compel the attendance of
witnesses.... They are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with
the principles of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in
complicated cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judg-
ment of arbitrators is but rusticum judicium. 26
Statutes eventually endorsed arbitration and defined its relation to
the courts. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) 27 attempted to
"revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements... and
to place [them] 'upon the sarae footing as other contracts.' "28 The FAA
applies to contracts within the federal maritime and commerce powers
and makes agreements to arbitrate "enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract. '29 The Act
authorizes federal courts to compel arbitration30 and allows them to
overturn awards only on very limited grounds, such as corruption of the
arbitrator or the granting of an award in "manifest disregard of the
law.",31
As arbitration became a familiar feature of commercial and labor
practice, regularized by its own institutions and mores, courts were less
likely to view it as unacceptable "rough justice." Recent Supreme Court
25. See Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Expe-
rience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 251-55 (1987). Indeed, in the early days there was a threat to judges'
pocketbooks, because "judges depended mainly or almost entirely on fees" for their income. Wo-
laver, supra note 24, at 141-42.
26. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065).
27. 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). The FAA has analogues in
most states, based on the Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985), formulated in 1955. See
Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IowA L. REv. 1137, 1140 n.32
(1986) (identifying 45 state statutes that enforce arbitration agreements).
28. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924)); see also Cohen & Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REv. 265, 274-78 (1926) (discussing the need for federal and state arbitration statutes).
29. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
30. Section 3 of the FAA provide; for a stay of proceedings when a court encounters an arbitra-
ble issue; § 4 authorizes federal courts that otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction to order par-
ties to honor arbitration agreements. See id. §§ 3-4.
31. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co.,
756 F.2d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1985); Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d
568, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1968). The statute sets forth the following grounds for overturning an award:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was eviden partiality or corruption in the arbitrators ....
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in ... refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators eaceeded their powers ....
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
446
Arbitration in Federal Programs
cases generally embrace arbitration.3 2 One likely explanation for this re-
versal is the judicial self-interest in reducing burdensome case loads.
Many observers-including some federal judges-argue that the case
load threatens the federal judiciary's capacity to perform essential func-
tions. 33 The search for case load solutions may skew legal doctrine,34
and one would expect the Court to err toward excessive receptivity to
alternative fora so long as they do not displace the courts' most valued
function of deciding major statutory and constitutional cases.
Arbitration in federal programs provides one solution by reducing
judicial case loads. Of course, statutory allocation of adjudicative re-
sponsibilities to administrative agencies relieves the courts of initial re-
sponsibility for vast numbers of cases.35 Nevertheless, the courts retain a
major supervisory role through routine judicial review of agency adjudi-
cations.3 6 Shifting from agency adjudication to arbitration reduces this
portion of judicial case loads, because review of arbitration is so limited.
Congress can provide courts further relief by assigning to agencies those
aspects of review that are high in volume and low in importance.
3 7
Therefore, the availability of arbitration in federal programs should ap-
peal to a harried judiciary.
B. Contractual Values in the Federal Arbitration Act Cases
The Supreme Court has not articulated a general constitutional the-
ory for allocating adjudicative responsibilities among the federal courts,
state courts, federal agencies, and private deciders. In the FAA cases,
however, the Court has allocated authority between the federal courts
and either the state courts or the private sector, considering issues such
32. See infra subpart II(B).
33. See, eg., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 94-129 (1985) (review-
ing the debilitating consequences of the "caseload explosion" in the federal courts); Baker & McFar-
land, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1410-14 (1987) (proposing a
new court to relieve the Supreme Court's work load); Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Commit-
tee, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1417, 1426-28 (1987) (arguing that elevation of the law-clarifying functions
of the Office of Law Revision Counsel would render a new court unnecessary).
34. For example, the Supreme Court's administrative law doctrine may reflect an attempt to
reduce judicial case loads. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093,
1117-22 (1987).
35. In 1984, there were 1121 administrative law judges (up from 196 in 1947), performing
functions that could have been assigned to federal district judges. Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudi-
cations: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 383, 383 (1984). The Social
Security Administration holds the largest number of these adjudications. See J. MASHAW, BUREAU-
CRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 18-19, 196 (1983) (noting that
the Social Security Administration decides approximately 1.3 million cases each year).
36. For example, in 1983 there were 20,309 filings in district court for review of Social Security
Administration decisions. R. POSNER, supra note 33, at 64.
37. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
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as parties' consent to arbitration, the limits of arbitral expertise, the ac-
ceptability of arbitration of public policy issues, and the nature of judicial
review of awards. Because taese same issues arise in cases reviewing ar-
bitration in federal programs., the FAA cases provide some guidance for
these disputes as well.
In recent FAA cases, the Court has emphasized the need to enforce
agreements to arbitrate. This contractual value has repeatedly
subordinated values that the Court ordinarily promotes, such as the effi-
cient resolution of disputes. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,38 for
example, the Court compelled arbitration of the state-law portion of a
securities dispute, even though the judgment severed pendent claims
from a suit properly in federal court. Rejecting an argument that the
FAA's sole purpose was to allow the speedy and efficient resolution of
disputes, the Court concluded that the Act's principal objective was "to
enforce agreements into which parties had entered. ' 39 Therefore, "'fed-
eral law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an
arbitration agreement.' "40
Federalism also yields to the contractual values embodied in the
FAA. In Perry v. Thomas,41 the Court held that the FAA preempted a
California statute forbidding arbitration of wage disputes. The Act's
"'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements ... create[s] a
body of federal substantive law of arbitrability.' "42 The Court's inter-
pretation of the FAA as displacing state policies, however, places a sub-
stantial gloss on the Act. Congress perhaps intended only to provide
procedure in federal court suits. 43
The Court's devotion to contract, as illustrated in Byrd and Perry,
may reflect a desire to reduce federal dockets. Disputes forced into court
by statutes such as that involved in Perry could often appear in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction. Similarly, pendent jurisdiction could
open federal courts to many state-law claims that might be resolved
through arbitration. By emphasizing contractual values, the Court
38. 470 U.S. 213, 218-21 (1985).
39. Id. at 220.
40. Id. at 221 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
20 (1983)).
41. 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2526-27 (1987).
42. Id. at 2525 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)).
43. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see
also Hirshman, supra note 24, at 1313-18 (noting that Congress could have intended the FAA to be
(1) only a procedural rule, (2) substantive law for cases in federal court, or (3) substantive law
applicable in state and federal court).
448
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serves its own interest in reducing the federal judiciary's work load and
requires the parties to absorb the inefficiencies of bifurcated disputes.
The contractual value, however, also suggests an important limit to
arbitration. Fearing that arbitrators will display insufficient sensitivity to
the limits of consent to their authority, courts do not allow arbitrators to
determine their own jurisdiction.44 Instead, courts construe the underly-
ing contracts, resolving doubts in favor of arbitrability. 45 In the related
field of labor arbitration, the Court has explained that the judicial check
on jurisdiction actually fosters arbitration by removing the disincentive
to enter into arbitration agreements that might arise if arbitrators could
decide jurisdiction limited only by their " 'understanding and con-
science.' "4 The presumption favoring arbitrability also reflects the
"greater institutional competence" 47 of arbitrators than courts in such
matters as interpreting collective bargaining agreements.
C. Enforcing Public Policy: Limits to Arbitrability
Traditionally, courts frowned upon the notion that arbitrators
should attempt to implement public policy through their decisions.
Courts expected them to confine their attention to interpreting the par-
ties' contracts. Two important cases involving arbitration in the securi-
ties industry, however, reveal a shift in the Supreme Court's willingness
to allow arbitrators to enforce public policy norms.
In Wilko v. Swan,48 the Court adopted the traditional view by hold-
ing that a customer's misrepresentation claims against brokers under the
Securities Act of 193349 were not subject to compulsory arbitration,
44. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967), the Court
held that an arbitrator could decide a claim that a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate was
induced by fraud, but not a claim that the agreement to arbitrate was tainted.
45. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
But this presumption of arbitrability, which arose in labor arbitration, does not extend to all con-
texts. See Schneider Moving & Storage v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1984) (holding that pre-
sumption, designed to minimize strikes and promote labor peace, was not applicable to contract with
trustee of benefit funds).
46. AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986) (quoting Cox,
Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. Rnv. 1482, 1509 (1959)). Although the FAA does
not apply to labor arbitration, the Court looks- to it for "guidance," in light of the similarity of the
two schemes. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 n.9 (1987).
47. AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650; see also Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, 828 F.2d 826,
829 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Pearce, the court observed that the rationale for the policy of resolving
jurisdictional doubts in favor of arbitration "is at its strongest where the arbitration will be governed
by procedures specifically tailored to the context from which the agreement to arbitrate arises, and
will be conducted by arbitrators who are expert in the norms and practices of the relevant industry."
Id.
48. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
49. The claims were brought under § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
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notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate.50 The Court concluded that
a provision in the 1933 Act forbidding waiver of compliance with its
requisites superseded the policies of the FAA. The Court feared that
disparities in bargaining power between securities sellers and buyers
could debase consent to arbitration. It concluded that, because of the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard used by courts under the FAA,
judicial review of arbitral awards was insufficient to protect the cus-
tomer's statutory rights.5
1
In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,5 2 the Court sharply
limited Wilko.5 3 The McMahons had signed customer agreement forms
providing for arbitration of any controversy arising out of their accounts
with Shearson.54 They sued in district court, alleging fraudulent conduct
and breach of fiduciary duties under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 55 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).56 The court of appeals held the claims nonarbitrable under both
federal statutes.
5 7
Reaffirming the contractual values that dominate recent FAA cases,
the Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the enforceability of
predispute arbitration agreements between brokerage firms and their cus-
tomers. In a broadly phrased opinion for the majority, Justice O'Connor
emphasized that the duty to enforce arbitration agreements "is not di-
minished"58 for claims founded on statutory fights, absent a showing
that arbitration "is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at is-
sue."'59 Addressing the Securities Exchange Act issues, the McMahon
Court characterized Wilko as an embodiment of traditional judicial sus-
picion of arbitration.60 This attitude conflicted with more recent cases
that both recognized the capability of arbitrators to resolve factual and
50. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. For discussions of-Wilko and its aftermath, see Fletcher, Privatizing
Securities Disputes Through the Enfor.ement ofArbitration Agreements, 71 MiNN. L. Rnv. 393, 404-
20 (1987) (analyzing the development of securities arbitration from 1953 to 1985); Kanowitz, supra
note 25, at 257-61 (discussing conflicting policies in securities arbitration cases).
51. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
52. 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2338-39 (1987).
53. In Noble v. Drexel, Burnhan, Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1987), the court
held that McMahon had retroactive application.
54. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2335.
55. The claims were brought urder § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
57. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 788 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S.
Ct. 2332 (1987). For the RICO claim, "public policy" considerations made arbitration inappropri-
ate, because issues of public interest required a judicial forum. For the securities claims, the court
felt bound by Wilko. See id. at 98-9).
58. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
59. Id. at 2339.
60. See id. at 2341.
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legal complexities and acknowledged the sufficiency of judicial review to
conform awards to statutory requirements. Indeed, since its decision in
Wilko, the Court had twice enforced agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims in international contracts.61 Justice O'Connor also noted that
Congress had given the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the
power to ensure the adequacy of the exchanges' arbitral procedures. 62
The Court confined Wilko to its holding under the 1933 Act.63
Proceeding to the RICO claims, the Court rejected the McMahons'
argument that the combination of compensatory and policing purposes in
the Act rendered arbitration inappropriate. The Court thought that the
"'adaptability and access to expertise' characteristic of arbitration" 64
permitted satisfactory arbitral resolution of even these complex and im-
portant statutory claims. Accurate assessments of liability would yield
an appropriate level of deterrence. Therefore, the Court upheld the par-
ties' agreement to arbitrate.
In McMahon, the Court demonstrated its willingness to expand the
category of rights that parties can agree to protect through arbitration.
The extent of the Court's willingness to sanction such developments,
however, is -open to question, because the Court has held that certain
federal statutes confer nonwaivable rights to judicial enforcement. In
McDonald v. City of West Branch,65 a former police officer went to arbi-
tration, claiming that the department discharged him without "proper
cause" and thereby violated a collective bargaining agreement. The of-
ficer lost the arbitration but later prevailed in a section 1983 suit, in
which he alleged that the discharge abridged his first amendment rights
61. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (trademark and securities). In both cases, how-
ever, the Court emphasized the special needs of parties to international contracts to select their fora.
62. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341-42. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented,
arguing that the majority had not shown SEC supervision of arbitration to be adequate to overcome
the disparities in bargaining power that the securities acts were designed to redress. See id. at 2353-
58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Earlier cases upholding securities arbitration had relied partly on
SEC oversight. See Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1012 (3d Cir. 1977); R.H. Johnson & Co. v.
SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); see alo Fletcher,
supra note 50, at 452 n.384 (pointing out that the SEC's oversight of arbitration adequately protects
investors in an investor/broker-dealer dispute, because the SEC has the power to change unfair
exchange arbitration rules). See generally Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 285-91 (1984) (discussing the development of securities arbitration and
concluding that the arbitration process must become more centralized and independent, with greater
public participation).
63. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341-43. In Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Ex-
press, 666 F. Supp. 219 (M.D. Ga. 1987), the court held that McMahon had not overruled Wilko.
But in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), the
court held that McMahon has so undermined Wilko that even § 12(2) claims, involved in Wilko
itself, are now arbitrable.
64. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2344 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633).
65. 466 U.S. 284, 286 (1984).
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of speech and association. 66 The Supreme Court refused to accord the
arbitration any preclusive effect in the subsequent trial.67 Drawing on
earlier cases, 68 the Court held that arbitration "cannot provide an ade-
quate substitute" for a trial in protecting federal statutory and constitu-
tional rights under section 1983.69
The McDonald Court gave four reasons for denying arbitration
preclusive effect. 70 Each requires reappraisal in light of McMahon.
Writing for the majority in McDonald, Justice Brennan began by quoting
the maxim that an arbitrator's expertise "'pertains primarily to the law
of the shop, not the law of the land.' "71 He thought that arbitrators,
many of whom are not lawyers, might lack the expertise necessary to
resolve complex legal questions. In contrast, McMahon recognized that
arbitrators can have expertise in both the law of the shop and the law of
the land. Similarly, Judge Edwards has stressed that the legal skills re-
quired to interpret statutes do not differ sharply from those required to
interpret contracts. 72 This is not to say, however, that arbitrators should
be able to act without guidace. Echoing McDonald's concern, Edwards
has suggested that although arbitrators can safely apply clearly def'ied
rules of law, federal courts should articulate important public-law norms.
Such an allocation of responsibilities might maximize the efficiency of
the judiciary. 73 The absence of a bright line between lawmaking and law-
applying will mean, of course, that new or broadly phrased statutes cre-
ate norms that must be elaborated and applied at the same time.74 These
are not appropriate instances for judicial restraint, however, because
under the Edwards formula, courts should defer only to arbitration that
66. Id.
67. Id. at 287-92. The Court earlier had held that the federal statute requiring full faith and
credit for "judicial proceedings" in :;tate courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), does not apply to
arbitration. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 477 (1982).
68. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-3est Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 734 (1981) (holding that arbi-
tration does not preclude suit to enforce minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 254 (1982)); Alecander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (holding
that arbitration does not preclude suit under title VII); see also Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the
Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determina-
tion Binding in a Court of Law?, 55 FORDIAM L. Rav. 63, 77-84 (1986) (discussing New York case
law giving arbitral issue determinations preclusive effect in state courts).
69. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292.
70. The Court also noted that ,ts holding might foster the informal resolution of grievances
through arbitrations that would not occur if they precluded access to court. Id. at 292 n. 11. Thus,
even in McDonald the Court evince. some concern for federal case loads.
71. Id. at 290 (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57).
72. See Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Edwards, J.).
73. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668,
680 (1986).
74. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (noting the "broad language"
of title VII as a reason for denying arbitration preclusive effect).
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is confined to applying known statutory criteria. 75
As its second justification, the McDonald Court advanced the tradi-
tional view that an arbitrator's jurisdiction derives solely from the con-
tract and does not include general authority to invoke public law that
conflicts with contractual terms.76 As McMahon illustrates, however, an
arbitrator's charge can specifically require enforcement of public-law ob-
ligations.77 Moreover, the Court has recently reaffirmed that arbitral
awards may be set aside if they conflict with an "explicit" public pol-
icy-that is, one contained in "the laws and legal precedents" rather than
"general considerations of supposed public interests. ' 78 Thus, arbitra-
tors are now expected to recognize the supremacy of clearly defined pub-
lic policy over contract.
The McDonald Court also thought that a union's acceptance of arbi-
tration should not necessarily be imputed to its individual members. 79
Although shared interests make the union a reliable proxy for most eco-
nomic issues, member interests are likely to diverge on issues of individ-
ual liberty. 0 Unlike labor arbitration, McMahon did not involve issues
of adequacy of representation. Still, McMahon evinced concern that con-
sent to arbitration be meaningful and found that concern satisfied by
75. The ACUS disfavors voluntary arbitration in federal programs when precedent is to be set
or when maintaining established norms is of "special importance." See 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 B.5.(b)
(1988). The recommendation on mandatory arbitration contains a similar limitation for precedential
effect and requires an ascertainable norm for decision, but it does not explicitly refer to cases involv-
ing the need to maintain norms. See id. § 305.86-3 C.8.
76. Indeed, in cases of conflict, the arbitrator must enforce the contract or risk invalidation of
the award. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 36, and United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
77. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343, 2345-56 (1987).
78. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 373 (1987) (citing W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983)); cf. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that award reinstating nuclear
plant employee who committed serious violations of safety regulations violates public policy). See
generally Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy De-
fense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 486 (1981) (arguing that public policy should prevent enforcement
of arbitration agreements only in very limited circumstances determined by statute or other legal
rules).
79. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291.
80. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974); see also Barrentine v. Arkan-
sas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981) (concluding that unions are not reliable representa-
tives for some statutory guarantees of individual economic entitlement). The Court has adhered to
the view that certain statutory rights for employees are not subject to compulsory arbitration. See,
e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1883 (1988) (holding that state-law claims
can be resolved independently of a collective bargaining agreement, provided that claim does not
require interpretation of the agreement); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564-67
(1987) (holding that a worker's Federal Employer's Liability Act claim for personal injuries could
not be subject to compulsory arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-159
(1982)); cf. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078-82 (1984) (expressing concerns about
the adequacy of union representation in settlements).
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agency supervision of arbitral schemes. 81
Finally, the McDonald Court observed that arbitral fact-finding is
not the equivalent of judicial fact-finding, because of the informality of
arbitral processes.8 2 The "reasons" for this conclusion merely describe
the ways in which arbitration usually deviates from trial processes. 83
The Court's unarticulated concern may have been that the arbitration of
civil rights or constitutional. issues threatens core judicial responsibili-
ties. 84 The McMahon decision did not address this issue, but in constitu-
tional litigation generally, the Court exercises relatively independent
review of the facts found below.85 Arbitration, on the other hand, leaves
fact determinations in the hands of the arbitrator and, because of the
absence of a detailed record, disables intensive fact review.
Perhaps, then, arbitration should never be used in constitutional or
civil rights controversies, even when the governing norm is clear. Such a
limitation, however, threatens to sweep too broadly. Some prisoners'
grievances, for example, might be better resolved through arbitration
than through federal court litigation. 86 Yet prisoners prove astute at
converting their grievances into constitutional claims, 8 7 and they might
successfully manipulate this limitation to avoid arbitration. Thus,
although the presence of a cDlorable constitutional claim identifies situa-
tions in which courts are likely to treat federal court enforcement as
mandatory, no categorical distinction seems appropriate.
D. Summary
Arbitration in federal programs can draw several lessons from com-
mercial and labor arbitration. First, agency oversight can allay concerns
that unequal bargaining power between private parties undermines their
consent to 'arbitration.88 Second, arbitrators can apply clearly defined
public policy norms. Finally, review by a government entity, such as a
81. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2356.
82. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291.
83. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58.
84. The Gardner-Denver Court emphasized that "the resolution of statutory or constitutional
issues is a primary responsibility of courts." Id. at 57.
85. See Monaghan, Constitutiona, Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 254-63 (1985) (analyz-
ing the scope of judicial review of fact issues underlying constitutional claims).
86. See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 175, 314-
16 (1970); Keating, Arbitration of-Inmate Grievances, 30 ARB. J. 177, 190 (1975).
87. See, eg., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (holding that negligent loss of a hobby kit
was a constitutional deprivation of property), overruled, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330
(1986).
88. See Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988) (relying
partly on the existence of SEC supervision in rejecting claims that brokerage agreements to arbitrate
are unconscionable contracts of adhesion).
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court, is needed both to identify arbitrable issues in case of dispute and to
conform awards to the law. For arbitration in federal programs, how-
ever, the traditional "manifest disregard of the law" standard is too re-
laxed.89 This standard reflects its originating context in contractual,
private law.90 Although the arbitral process is not suited to ordinary
appellate review, it is feasible to require enough explanation of the basis
of an award to allow review for facial violation of a governing public-law
norm.91
The commercial and labor arbitration cases consider one aspect of
the boundary between public and private decision making. But arbitra-
tion in federal programs, because of its nexus with public policy making,
raises broader issues. Part III introduces a general frame of reference
identifying activities that must be kept within government or defining
relationships that public officials must have with private deciders to
whom they delegate power.
III. Delegation to Private Parties in American Law
Questions about the permissibility of placing governmental power in
private hands occur throughout American law.92 Unfortunately, courts
tend to make broad statements that are inconsistent with both theory and
practice and that hamper analysis of "delegation to private parties." A
brief survey of the public/private distinction illustrates this point and
guides further analysis.
A. The Delegation Doctrine
The Supreme Court has occasionally considered the permissibility of
delegations to private parties. The most prominent case is Carter v.
Carter Coal Co. ,93 in which the Court invalidated a federal statute that
89. See Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. Rav. 1, 28
(1987) (noting that the "manifest disregard" standard generally does not allow setting aside awards
for "mere mistaken legal interpretations").
90. See, eg., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 370 (1987):
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by
them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the
contract that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or
legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate* court does in reviewing decisions of lower
courts.
91. See, eg., Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 397 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 1968) (encour-
aging district court to ask arbitrators to explain the basis of their award); Sargent v. Paine Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 923 (D.D.C. 1987) (vacating arbitral award and remanding
to arbitration panel for explanation as to how damages were computed).
92. For a comprehensive review, see Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Con-
stitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975).
93. 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
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allowed a majority of miners in cooperation with the producers of two-
thirds of the annual tonnage of coal to set maximum hours and minimum
wages for the industry:
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power
to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation
to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to
private persons whose irrerests may be and often are adverse to the
interests of others in the same business. 94
The Court announced an absolute principle condemning delegations to
interested private deciders 1:o regulate others: "[I]n the very nature of
things, one person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the
business of another, and especially of a competitor." 95 Although its rhet-
oric suggests reliance on the delegation doctrine, the Court held the stat-
ute invalid because it denied the miners and producers in the minority
due process.96
The Court had earlier considered the delegation doctrine in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.97 In that case, the Court over-
turned the portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that
authorized the President to approve industry-generated codes of fair
competition. The majority asked whether "it be seriously contended that
Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade... groups so as
to empower them to enact ihe laws they deem to be wise and beneficent
for ... their trade or industries?" 98 Such a delegation of legislative
power, the Court continued, "is unknown to our law and is utterly incon-
sistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress." 99 In
rejecting the grant of authority, however, the Court stressed the breadth
of the field within which the President and the code drafters could
roam l°° rather than the potential for interested private decisions to be
rubber-stamped by busy bureaucrats-though the Court was well aware
that chaos pervaded the National Recovery Administration.101
The Schechter Poultry Court failed to distingiisg clearly between
three possible grounds for objecting to the NIRA: that the delegation
was too broad to be exercised by anyone, that government should have
retained discretion granted to private parties, or that government super-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 310-12.
97. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
98. Id. at 537.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 538-39, 541-42.
10L See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 61-62 (1965).
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vision of private decision making was insufficient. Any of these objec-
tions could be called a violation of the Constitution's grant of legislative
powers to Congress, but they have different implications.
Both Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal inveigh against the delega-
tion of legislative powers to private actors. Notwithstanding the New
Deal Court's confident dicta, the path of the case law wavers. In early
cases, the Court sometimes struck down land-use regulations authorizing
groups of property owners to control some uses of their neighbors' prop-
erty.10 2 Yet the Court has repeatedly upheld delegations of power to
interested private persons, allowing Congress to condition the operation
of regulatory schemes on their granting or withholding of consent.
10 3
For example, the issuance of federal milk marketing orders, which regu-
late prices, depends on the consent of dairy farmers and milk handlers. 14
The Court's efforts to distinguish the issues and resolve inconsistencies in
the cases have been very weak.105 It can be said, however, that delega-
tions to interested private deciders are in jeopardy, even if Carter Coal
and Schechter Poultry overstate the prohibition. The inquiry must widen
in order to derive additional guidance and to explain the absence of a rule
that all private delegations are unconstitutional.
102. See, eg., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-23 (1928)
(striking down zoning ordinance that required permission from surrounding property owners prior
to erecting a home for the aged); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1912) (striking
down ordinance that authorized adjoining property owners to establish building line before the erec-
tion of a new building). But see Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1917)
(upholding such a limitation). For an example of a modem court struggling with the Court's dis-
tinctions, see Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1086-87 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
103. See, eg., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 108-09 (1978) (uphold-
ing statute requiring an automobile manufacturer to obtain state approval before operating a dealer-
ship if an existing franchisee objected); H.P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 595 (1939)
(upholding equalization provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608c
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), which fixed minimum producer prices on milk after agreement by at least
two-thirds of the milk producers); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939)
(upholding provision of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act allowing vote of two-thirds of
producers to be sufficient for issuing certain government orders); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-
16 (1939) (upholding Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 511 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), which with-
held regulation of a market unless two-thirds of the voting growers favored it). For a critique of the
Fox case, see Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L.
REv. 849, 854-57, 870-75 (1980).
104. In Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-48, 352 (1984), the Court held
that this statutory scheme impliedly precluded judicial review at the behest of consumers. The
Court assumed the validity of the statute, which had been upheld in Rock Royal and H.P. Hood,
and, indeed, confirmed the power of the producers and handlers through its preclusion holding. See
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REv. 4, 49-50 (1984).
105. See Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201, 221-34 (1937) (attempt-
ing to sort out irregularities in the Court's decisions); Liebmann, supra note 92, at 655-61 (conclud-
ing that the Court's doctrine is "nonsense").
457
Texas Law Review Vol. 67:441, 1989
B. The Public/Private Dist'inction
1. The Impossibility qf a Clear Boundary Between Public and Pri-
vate Activity.-The boundary of the public sector in American life has
never been distinct.106 Our history has not produced any clear tradition
allocating some functions to government and others to the private
sphere, from which a positive theory of government might be drawn.107
Nor has any satisfactory normative theory emerged.10 8 Scholars, busi-
nessmen, and government officials still disagree over the appropriate
scope of the public sphere.
This uncertainty has not prevented groups from calling for "priva-
tization" of many government functions, in hopes of obtaining private
sector efficiencies.' 0 9 Congress has created public/private hybrids in the
form of statutory corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority,
the United States Postal Service, and Amtrak, that perform many impor-
tant functions." 0 Controversy surrounds the constitutionality of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), a blend of public and private
individuals that forms and executes the nation's monetary policy.1
1'
106. See Horwitz, The History of,1he Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1426-
27 (1982) (discussing twentieth-century debates on the public/private distinction).
107. See Garcia v. San Antonio Netro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543-47 (1985) (stressing the
unworkability of any attempt to identify "traditional government functions" for tenth amendment
purposes).
108. See generally The Public/Prvate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982) (surveying
divergent points of view on the role of government). For a cogent summary of normative theories
and their limits, see Steiner, Public Expenditure Budgeting, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE
241, 248-57 (Brookings Inst. 1974).
109. See, e.g., S. BUTLER, PRIVATIZING FEDERAL SPENDING: A STRATEGY TO ELIMINATE
THE DEFICIT 32-33 (1985) (stating that federal spending should be privatized because constituency
pressures force legislators to support higher federal spending); E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 89-93 (1982) (stating that mzny government sources can be "contracted out," which would
heighten efficiency); Kolderie, The Two Different Concepts of Privatization, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
285, 288 (1986) (arguing that compettion should reduce the "unit costs" of many government func-
tions). For further commentary on the issue of privatization, see Privatization: The Assumptions and
the Implications, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 445 (1988), and Overview: Perspectives on Privatization and the
Public Interest, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1988).
110. See Tierney, Government Corporations and Managing the Public's Business, 99 POL. SCI. Q.
73, 75 (1984).
111. In Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d
561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988), a district court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the FOMC. The court noted that the private members do not have the "decisive voice" in
policy making, because the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System holds a majority. Id.
at 523 & n.26. The court also distinguished the coercive functions of government from monetary
policy making and noted that the FOMC exercises no direct governmental authority. Id. at 523
n.26. Conceding the importance of monetary policy, the court observed that many private institu-
tions also greatly affect the nation's economy. Id. at 520-22. Finally, the court relied partly on
tradition-a combination of public znd private decision makers have formulated monetary policy
since the days of the Bank of the United States. Id. at 521-22. The court of appeals vacated the
district court opinion on standing grounds, without reaching the merits. Melcher v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988).
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Faced with great difficulties in categorization, analysts often retreat
to the notoriously conclusory distinction between inherently "govern-
mental" functions, which must be kept in official hands, and "proprie-
tary" functions, which may be exercised privately. 112 In identifying
administrative functions that private contractors may perform, for exam-
ple, the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) says
merely that government employees must continue to perform "those ac-
tivities which require either the exercise of discretion in applying Gov-
ernment authority or the use of value judgment in making decisions for
the Government." 113 Such statements, of course, provide no useful gui-
dance, and it thus remains unclear which activities are properly subject
to privatization.
The difficulties in defining what functions must be public are
matched by difficulties in deciding when formally private actions become
legally public for some purposes. In identifying those relationships be-
tween private institutions and the state that invoke constitutional restric-
tions on "state action," the Supreme Court has refused to characterize
private activity as state action, notwithstanding substantial public fman-
cial support and close regulation." 4 Instead, the Court looks for direct
state coercion or encouragement of the particular decision in question.
Given the pervasiveness of government regulation and subsidy in modern
life, a test that looks only for government entanglement would risk en-
snaring the private sector in the legal restraints that apply to govern-
ment. The Court's analysis, however, does little to clarify which private
delegations are constitutionally improper.
These uncertainties about the public/private boundary occur partly
because private influence permeates even formal, public decision mak-
ing."15 Traditional views of government as the neutral and expert elabo-
112. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985) (describing the
difficult task of finding a principled distinction between private and governmental functions); Wells
& Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. RyV.
1073, 1075-78 (1980) (describing this "distinction" as a cluster of rules whose purposes courts have
not articulated carefully).
113. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-76 (REVISED) § 6e (Aug. 4, 1983); see also Note, Privatization and
the Reagan Administration: Ideology and Application, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 229, 232-50 (1988).
114. See, eg., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-12 (1982) (finding no state action by a
regulated private nursing home because the state was not responsible for the specific conduct in the
complaint); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-42 (1982) (finding no state action by private
school that accepted public funds but operated free of state regulation or compulsion); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-59 (1974) (finding no state action by an exclusively
licensed and heavily regulated utility because its conduct was not sufficiently connected to the state);
see also Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449, 502-08 (1988) (ex-
plaining that courts have been reluctant to extend "special inhibitions on public activity" to private
actions, except possibly with regard to racial discrimination).
115. See T. Lows, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC
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ration of the public's will have given way to theories that recognize and
try to control private influences. 116 Current theories of legislation em-
phasize its capacity to provide not only "public goods" for all but also
"private goods" for special interests." 7 Controversy surrounds the ex-
tent to which courts should try to offset this tendency." 8
Similarly, administrative law recently experienced the ascendancy of
an interest representation theory of policy making.1 9 Competing views
of the administrative process emphasize the opportunity-and the
duty--of administrators to seek their best conceptions of the public inter-
est, although private pressures may constrain decisions.1 20 To promote
public-regarding policy, modern administrative law relies on fostering
and controlling the oversight activities of all three branches of govern-
ment. 121 But shifting decision making from public to private hands viti-
ates these monitoring de,,ices. For a delegation to survive, then,
substitutes must tolerably conform private decision to the public interest.
2. The Public Uses of Private Interest.-Many "private law" ar-
rangements bind unconsenting persons and are to that extent "public" in
effect. Ancient doctrines of property and contract allow private persons
to make law, for example, by imposing restrictive covenants on land.
Similarly, government often, authorizes private groups to exert coercive
powers. One prominent illustration is the collective bargaining agree-
ment, by which a majority of workers in a bargaining unit selects a repre-
AUTHORITY 298-99 (1969) (arguing :hat positive government power has been distributed among
interest groups to the detriment of the general public interest).
116. For a recent summary and entique of these theoretical developments, see Fitts, The Vices of
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective or, Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L.
Rv. 1567 (1988).
117. See, e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 37-52 (1982) (describing Congress as the primary agent responsible for generating the
production of private benefits and agencies as facilitating the regulatory production of such benefits).
118. Compare Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 240-56 (1986) (arguing that the "public-regard-
ing" Constitution permits judges to regulate special interest groups by applying traditional statutory
interpretation to impose subtle pressures on Congress and to exact costs from more selfish groups)
with Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L.
REv. 263, 290-91 (1982) (applying eoanomic theory to view courts primarily as agents who are ill-
disposed to oppose legislation benefiting special interests because statutory amendment can nullify
courts' policy-making interpretations).
119. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1669, 1760-1802 (1975) (describing the political modes of interest representation in administra-
tive law).
120. See, eg., Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 81-83
(1985) (advocating a "Madisonian" approach whereby administrators "maximize aggregate utility"
as defined by "reference to public desires").
121. See generally Bruff, Legislatve Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TExAs L. REV.
207, 229-44 (1984) (reviewing externsd sources of influence on agency decision making).
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sentative who may bind them all. 122 Another is the formation of special
taxing districts by petition of some residents in a territory, against the
wishes of the others. 123
Analysis of these examples reveals justifications for private delega-
tions that the Carter Coal Court did not perceive. Because of market-
based incentives, decisions of private groups may be acceptable as proxies
for more widely shared interests.124 In Carter Coal, if all workers in the
industry had similar interests in higher wages and all companies had sim-
ilar interests in lower ones, the outcome of bargaining by a subset of both
groups might have been fair within the industry.12 5 Also, shared inter-
ests within a group may promote the fairness of self-regulation. A prem-
ise of collective bargaining is that whatever their internal disagreements,
workers derive net advantages from negotiating as a group with
management. 126
In these shared-interest delegations, the creation of a small "govern-
ment" promotes fairness. Such an entity makes a series of decisions that
will not predictably advantage any particular participant. But this justi-
fication, which can be offered for entities as diverse as water districts,
collective bargaining units, and homeowners' associations, does not apply
to single-decision delegations. Therefore, whether this reasoning sup-
ports the use of arbitration in government programs depends on the pres-
ence or absence of repeat players. Interest arbitration of a labor contract
between an agency and its employees, for example, could openly consider
distribution issues ("How well did the union do last time around?") that
would be out of place in the arbitration of an individual's Medicare
claim.
Courts often uphold private delegations when the private deciders
share interests with the general public. Thus, effective self-regulation by
securities exchanges serves to maintain the public confidence on which
the exchanges depend for their business. Clear boundaries to these pri-
vate delegations do not always exist-consider government regulation by
122. See, e.g., Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943) (holding
that the National Mediation Board's certification of a collective bargaining representative, elected by
a majority of workers, was not subject to judicial review under the Railway Labor Act).
123. See Liebmann, supra note 92, at 672-75 (commenting that imposition of judicial checks on
local taxing districts seems inappropriate).
124. See Gillette, Who Puts the Public in the Public Good?: A Comment on Cass, 71 MARQ. L.
REv. 534, 538-39 (1988) (suggesting that permissibility of delegation should depend on the suffi-
ciency of either political accountability or market forces to give delegate incentives to consider all
affected interests).
125. Jaffe, supra note 105, at 249-50. Of course, this conclusion would depend on the nature of
bargaining power in the industry, but the Carter Coal Court failed to reach any such empirical
question.
126. Id. at 235.
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agencies staffed by members of regulated professional groups. 127 These
situations present informational advantages: doctors can assess the suffi-
ciency of medical training, and the state bar understands the pressures
that lawyers face. Of course, the danger remains that shared group inter-
ests will subordinate the inte-rests held in common with the public. But
these concerns only suggest that such delegations should be controlled
rather than avoided; the results may be imperfect, but so are the
alternatives.
One possible public control is a standard to which the delegate must
conform. Standards, however, help only when the decisions are amena-
ble to them. A test of induttrial bargaining power, as in Carter Coal,
may not admit of a standard, although grievance arbitration under a re-
sulting contract presupposes one. For standards to be effective, some
government entity must check the delegate's compliance. 12 In Schechter
Poultry, the statute contained criteria for the President's approval of pri-
vately drafted codes-for example, that the private groups be truly repre-
sentative of the industry. 129 Although these standards may have sufficed
for facial validity of the private delegation, the adequacy of the Presi-
dent's discharge of his monitoring duties pursuant to them raised an en-
tirely different question.
As Schechter Poultry illustrates, the importance of asking whether
government supervision is real or merely nominal is greatest when for-
mally public action has dominant private aspects. For example, statutes
sometimes authorize agencies to transform private industry standards
into government regulations. 130 Federal judges also enforce consent
agreements in public-law litigation, as negotiated by private parties.'
31
Whether adequate public control exists for such delegated powers de-
pends on both the selection of the governmental monitor and the articu-
lation of its role; these decisions depend on the structure of a particular
program.
127. See United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agric. Employment Relations Bd., 727 F.2d 1475,
1479-80 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding constitutionality of a statute requiring interest-group representa-
tion on a regulatory body).
128. Jaffe, supra note 105, at 249-51.
129. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-23 (1935).
130. See Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 1329, 1450-51 (1978); see also
Allied Tube & Conduct Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931, 1937-38 (1988) (noting that
private standards-setting organizations are not "governmental" for purposes of antitrust immunity,
even though governments often adopt their standards). See generally R. DIXON, STANDARDS DE-
VELOPMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THOUGHTS ON INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND PROCE-
DURAL FAIRNESS (1978).
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IV. An Approach to the Constitutional Issues
Several principles guide the analysis of the constitutionality of arbi-
tration in federal programs. First, as the preceding survey of the public/
private boundary suggests, 132 the optimal specificity of constitutional
rules that regulate the organization of government is low. 133 The size
and diversity of government and the use of arbitration in a wide range of
programs means that no single set of detailed constitutional criteria can
readily be crafted to fit them all. Moreover, predicting the effects of
rules on institutions is hazardous, even in the short run. Arbitration in
government is still experimental; courts should not shackle evolving pro-
cedures with rigid constitutional doctrine.
Second, courts should defer to administrative or legislative choice of
procedure, whether the issue is statutory authorization134 or constitu-
tionality. 135 The acceptability of a procedure is a function of the particu-
lar issues to be decided,136 and both Congress and administrative
agencies are capable of evaluating the factors relevant to choosing a
procedure.
Finally, as the "private delegation" cases demonstrate, powers
granted to private deciders must be structured so that both internal in-
centives and outside supervision conform their decisions to the public
interest.1 37  This judgment is necessarily specific to each particular
program.
The remainder of this Article employs separation of powers analysis
to determine the consistency of government arbitration with articles II
and III of the Constitution. Here a fundamental distinction must be
made to understand the cases. Separation of powers cases involving the
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another present greater
problems than those posing only a possible interference with the preroga-
tives of one branch. 138 In the aggrandizement cases, the Court favors a
formalist approach that reasons logically from the constitutional text and
what is known about the framers' intentions. 39 The Court consequently
132. See supra section III(B)(1).
133. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 491,
493-94 (1987).
134. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 524-25 (1978).
135. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
136. See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 536-37 (1970).
137. See supra section III(B)(2).
138. See Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions--A Fool-
ish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 517-26 (1987).
139. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986) (forbidding an officer removable by
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draws relatively bright lines between the functions of the branches. In
the interference cases, the Court uses a functional approach that evalu-
ates the impairment of a branch's core responsibilities. 140
These two doctrinal approaches reflect their underlying values. In
cases addressing the relations of the constitutional branches inter se, for-
malism offers the advantages of preserving clear lines of political ac-
countability and of minimizing evasions of constitutional strictures.14
1
For the organization of the "fourth branch" of the bureaucracy, how-
ever, formalism's simplicities would not permit the complexity that ad-
ministrative structure requires. The Court accordingly shifts to a
functional inquiry that evaluates the overall relationships between the
constitutional branches and the agencies.142 The functional test is far
more permissive of diverse government structure than is formalism. It is
well suited to conforming arbitration in federal programs to the values
embodied in both articles II and III of the Constitution, as the following
analysis demonstrates.
V. Granting Judicial Power to Agencies and Arbitrators
To what extent may adjudicative authority that could be assigned to
the federal courts be placed in other hands, including those of arbitra-
tors? Article III creates the "judicial Power of the United States," but
the federal courts are not it, sole repository. 143 State courts also decide
federal questions and cases within federal diversity jurisdiction.144 This
distribution of business results partly from Congress's disinclination to
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts and partly from parties'
selection of state courts. The FAA also shifts business away from the
federal courts by fostering the use of private arbitrators for many cases
Congress from exercising executive functions); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (invali-
dating legislative vetoes as equivalent to legislation that evades article I strictures).
140. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2608-09, 2621 (1988) (upholding the vesting of
prosecutorial functions in an independent counsel partially insulated from executive supervision);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-54 (1986) (declining to adopt
formalistic rules to determine when Congress impermissibly threatens the integrity of the judiciary);
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs, 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977) (rejecting an "airtight" separa-
tion of powers in favor of a flexible assessment of the extent to which a statute prevents the executive
branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions).
141. See generally Bruff, supra nole 133, at 506-09 (arguing that formalism may rest on a judg-
ment that the executive branch should be solely responsible for administration).
142. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 667-68.
143. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For an over-
view of the issues discussed in this Part, see Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and Article IIl, 101 HARV. L. REv. 915 (1988).
144. Indeed, state courts have always carried part of the federal work load. Congress did not
grant general federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts until 1875. See F. FRANK-
FURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928).
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within the federal judicial power. Not surprisingly, clear limits to con-
gressional power over federal jurisdiction have never emerged, resulting
in confusion over limits in particular contexts. 45
A. Delegation of Adjudicative Power in Administrative Law
Even within the federal government, no obvious theory underlies the
distribution of adjudicative business among the available fora. Variations
appear in both institutional characteristics and procedural formality.
The catalogue includes article III district courts, article III adjuncts
(such as bankruptcy courts), "legislative" courts (such as the Tax Court),
administrative agencies employing the full adjudicative procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),146 and agencies employing more
informal procedures.1 47 The last category, informal executive adjudica-
tion, includes much case-by-case decision making.1 48 Hence it includes a
vast number and range of decisions, such as personnel promotions and
contract awards. Agencies often conduct this adjudication without any
statutorily specified procedure, but in many instances the results are sub-
ject to meaningful judicial review.
1 49
The federal courts could conceivably adjudicate many of these kinds
of cases under federal question jurisdiction, but a vastly bloated judiciary
and an equally shrunken executive would result. More importantly,
some functionally adjudicative activities are "executive" in the constitu-
tional sense and may not be transferred to the courts. An obvious exam-
ple is the President's exercise of law-applying judgment pursuant to
responsibilities conferred on him by the Constitution or by statute. 150 On
a more mundane level, the Supreme Court, in delineating the boundary
between legislative and executive responsibilities, has noted that
"[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative
mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law." 51 Yet this defini-
145. See Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Con-
gress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. Rnv. 17, 19-20
(1981) (finding "no more than a glimmer of consensus" on such limits).
146. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1982).
147. See Lubbers, supra note 35, at 387 (listing informal procedures).
148. Chief Justice Marshall perceived this problem in 1833:
That [a Treasury officer's setting of the amount of a duty] may be, in an enlarged sense, a
judicial act, must be admitted .... In this sense the act of the President in calling out the
militia under [a statute] or of a commissioner who makes a certificate for the extradition of
a criminal, under a treaty, is judicial.
Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558).
149. The Supreme Court mandated such review in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
150. See Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REv. 1, 17-18
(1982).
151. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
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tion also describes a principad activity of the federal courts.1 52 Plainly, a
simple formalist distinction will not suffice for separation of powers
purposes.15
3
The Court has struggled to identify adjudicative functions that must
remain in federal courts, those that may be placed in the executive, and
those that must be placed in the executive.1 54 Despite these uncertain-
ties, the legitimacy of administrative adjudication bears on the constitu-
tionality of arbitration in federal programs. Theories that justify
transferring judicial power to agencies may also provide support for the
further step of delegating it to arbitrators.
In administrative law, analysis of agency adjudication usually begins
with the relatively formal model for which the APA provides a code of
procedure. The trier of fact is an administrative law judge (ALJ), and
the agency performs appellate-style review of the AL's decision. This
discussion reviews the Supreme Court's analysis of this decision-making
model, noting variations explicitly.
Crowell v. Benson 155 established the constitutionality of delegating
adjudicative power to administrative agencies. Congress had created a
workers' compensation scheme for longshoremen and had authorized an
agency to decide claims under procedures resembling those later codified
in the APA.156 The Court rejected a due process assault on administra-
tive fact-finding, because judicial review could assure the presence of sub-
stantial evidence for the award.15 7 Article III did not require that the
subject matter, which was within the federal judicial power, be allocated
to the courts. It sufficed that reviewing courts retained power to decide
issues of law.' 58 The Court did hold, however, that courts must perform
independent review of issues of constitutional or jurisdictional fact going
to the power of the agency over the dispute, 5 9 such as whether an acci-
dent had occurred on navigable waters.
Although Crowell set the stage for modem administrative adjudica-
tion, much has happened since. The two limitations on which the Court
152. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963-67 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (characterizing
congressional review of agency adjudication as unconstitutional intervention in a judicial function).
153. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 748-53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the difficulty of drawing
lines between the powers exercised by different branches, because particular functions "often take on
the aspect of the office to which [they] are assigned").
154. This subpart discusses the first two categories and Part VI addresses the third in connection
with article II doctrine.
155. 285 U.S. 22, 31 (1932).
156. An examiner was to conduct evidentiary hearings on a record. Id. at 47-48.
157. Id. at 46, 49.
158. See id. at 49.
159. Id. at 63-64.
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relied to justify shifting article III business to agencies have eroded.
Courts now defer to agency determinations of law as well as fact, 16° and
the doctrines of constitutional and jurisdictional fact have fallen into dis-
use.161 These developments reflect the evolving nature of administrative
adjudications, which have developed attributes that promote competence
and fairness.
Crowell evinced concern about the fairness of adjudication per-
formed outside court. Modern administrative law responds partly
through structure, partly through procedure. Ostensibly pursuing exper-
tise, many agencies draw their membership from regulated groups. Typi-
cally, such agencies both investigate and adjudicate. This combination
aids policy making but also gives rise to problems of bias and interest
that the organizational separation of investigative and adjudicative staffs
attempts to solve.' 62 For similar reasons, administrative law judges enjoy
statutory guarantees of their independence 63 and must normally follow
APA procedures that attempt to balance informality and accuracy.
The Supreme Court has upheld this general arrangement against
due process attack' 64 because of the protections flowing from the separa-
tion of functions and procedural guarantees. 65 Moreover, the Court tol-
erates some loss of neutrality as the cost of obtaining the policy-making
advantages of combined functions at the top of an agency.' 66 Notwith-
standing the Court's general approval, however, the characteristics of a
particular scheme can present unacceptable dangers of bias or interest.167
160. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 859-66 (1984);
see also Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 292-99 (1986)
(noting the Court's inconsistent application of this doctrine).
161. Crowell held that reviewing courts should not only exercise independent judgment on these
issues but also compile an independent record. Justice Brandeis dissented from the latter conclusion
and has since been vindicated. See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 247-63.
162. See generally Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759, 761-79 (1981) (reviewing statutory and constitutional
law of separation of functions and surveying agency practice).
163. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 5372, 7521 (1982); see also Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law
Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111-12 (1981) (describing APA
provisions that attempt to ensure the independence of ALJs).
164. See, eg., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-55 (1975) (finding that state board of medical
examiners could both investigate and decide charges against a doctor).
165. See, eg., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 245-50 (1980) (finding that an administra-
tor acting as prosecutor could make a preliminary assessment of civil penalties when the ALU and
not the administrator adjudicated the penalties).
166. See, ag., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (finding no constitutional objection to a
legislature drawing administrators from an organization sympathetic to the rules to be enforced);
Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 492-96 (1976) (hold-
ing that a school board could both negotiate with teachers and discharge them for illegally striking
after negotiations failed); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948) (holding that members
of the Federal Trade Commission could both testify before Congress regarding the illegality of a
practice and later adjudicate the matter).
167. See, eg., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 581 (1973) (refusing to allow a licensing board
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Like the private delegation cases, therefore, administrative law dis-
plays a basic ambivalence about the deciders' neutrality-the benefits of
obtaining knowledgeable or autonomous decision making inure at the
risk of introducing unacceptable levels of bias or interest. Arbitration
can ameliorate these problems. Its central premise is that consent to the
process and practical guarantees of deciders' neutrality justify an infor-
mal and final procedure. Indeed, the nature of arbitration calls to mind
an observation that Judge Friendly made in discussing administrative
procedure: "[T]he further the tribunal is removed from ... any suspi-
cion of bias, the less may be the need for other procedural safeguards." 168
B. Public Rights, Private Rights, and Federal Arbitration
The Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co. 169 cast into doubt matters long thought settled by
Crowell. The statute at issue in Northern Pipeline authorized bankruptcy
judges to decide all issues pertinent to the proceedings in their courts-
including claims arising under state law-with review by article III
judges. 170 A badly divided Court held that the allocation to bankruptcy
judges of authority to decide state-law claims violated article III. The
bankruptcy judges lacked article III status1 71 but had powers closely re-
sembling those of federal judges. A plurality of four justices172 signed a
formalist opinion that defined some matters as inherently judicial in the
sense that federal courts must decide them in the first instance rather
than supervise them in appellate review. Existing exceptions to
mandatory article III jurisd:iction failed to include bankruptcy matters.
The exception pertinent here concerned "public rights," which the
plurality defined narrowly as claims against government that Congress
could commit entirely to executive discretion, but not controversies be-
tween private persons arising incident to a federal program.1 73 Thus, the
drawn from one-half of a state's optometrists to decide whether the other half were engaged in
unprofessional conduct); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1972) (finding a due
process violation because mayor trying petitioner was responsible for municipal finances and fines
formed a substantial part of municipal revenues); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523-31 (1927) (find-
iag that a town mayor's personal pecuniary interest in convicting a defendant violated due process
because the fines paid his salary). 'Ibis line of cases has deep roots in the common law. See
Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 30, 34 (1926).
168. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975).
169. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
170. Review was to be by the "clearly erroneous" standard. See id. at 55 n.5.
171. Instead of life tenure, the bankruptcy judges had 14-year terms, and they had no protec-
tions against salary diminution. Id. al. 53.
172. Justice Brennan wrote for thD plurality, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens. Id. at 52.
173. See id. at 67-69.
468
Vol. 67:441, 1989
Arbitration in Federal Programs
dichotomy between public and private rights rested partly on sovereign
immunity. Congress, free to deny all relief for claims against the govern-
ment, could take the lesser step of allocating the claims to an alternative
forum. The plurality thus refused to define public rights as everything
created pursuant to the substantive powers of Congress,1 74 an interpreta-
tion that would have displaced some private rights of action.
The plurality thought that Congress could commit public rights
cases to agencies, if it assured judicial review. 175 Nevertheless, the Jus-
tices emphasized that Crowell had endorsed nonjudicial decision only for
issues of fact.176 Yet the plurality conceded the erosion of the doctrines
of constitutional and jurisdictional fact on which Crowell relied to pre-
serve close supervision of agencies.1 77 This analysis casts doubt on the
permissibility of ordinary delegations of adjudicative power to agencies,
because the plurality did not specify the relationship between agencies
and courts that was necessary to pass constitutional scrutiny.
Two concurring justices took the more limited position that state-
law claims removed from a state tribunal must go to an article III
court.1 78 The dissenters pointed out the inconsistency of the plurality's
formulation with the ordinary pattern of administrative adjudication.179
They thought that the bankruptcy scheme satisfied a functional inquiry,
which entailed examining the strength of congressional interests in plac-
ing decision-making authority in another forum.18 0 Moreover, they em-
phasized the statute's preservation of judicial review and found no
danger of aggrandizement by the other branches at the expense of the
courts as long as the subject matter was not especially significant to the
political branches. 81
The use of the public rights doctrine, which the Court has never
explained coherently, sowed much confusion in Northern Pipeline.18 2
The doctrine originated in a conclusory passage in Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 1 8 3 in which the Court upheld a sum-
174. See id. at 80 n.32.
175. See id. at 67-68 & 67 n.18.
176. See id. at 78-82.
177. See id. at 82 n.34.
178. See id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, J.).
179. See id. at 101-02 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.).
180. See id. at 117.
181. See id. at 116.
182. See, eg., Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline
Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 197, 204-14 (questioning the reasoning behind the public/private rights
dichotomy). For an able historical treatment of the public rights doctrine, see Young, Public Rights
and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFFALO L.
REV. 765 (1986).
183. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). Murray's Lessee appears to overturn an earlier case,
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mary procedure for the government to recoup funds from one of its cus-
toms collectors:
[W]e do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a
suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the
other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which,
from its nature, is not a ,.ubject for judicial determination. At the
same time there are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting
on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but
which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.
1 84
The Court, groping for appropriate limits to the jurisdiction of legis-
lative and administrative courts, has used the public rights doctrine to
label outcomes. For example, in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Commission,'85 the Court considered whether the sev-
enth amendment applies to the assessment of civil penalties in an admin-
istrative adjudication. The Court held that when the government "sues
in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes
within the power of Congress to enact," the seventh amendment does
"not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact-finding function and ini-
tial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would
be incompatible."'
186
Although it replaced analysis with assertion, the Court did suggest a
functional basis for its holding. The seventh amendment does not re-
quire Congress to "choke the already crowded federal courts with new
types of litigation," nor does it prevent it from "committing some new
types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in
the relevant field."'187 The Court observed that this conclusion would
follow even if the seventh anendment would require a jury had Congress
assigned the adjudication of "those rights... to a federal court of law
United States v. Ames, 24 F. Cas. 784, 789-90 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,441), in which a court
refused to enforce an arbitration award involving the water rights of the United States and another
riparian owner. As an alternate ground of decision, the court stated a principle forbidding the dele-
gation of article III judicial power oulside the courts. Id. at 789.
184. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. The Court's difficulty in articulating its distinc-
tion comprehensibly probably stemmed from its recognition of the overlap of judicial and executive
functions, which it drew from Chief Justice Marshall's insight in Exparte Randolph (quoted at supra
note 148). The Murray's Lessee Court acknowledged "[tihat the auditing of the accounts of a re-
ceiver of public moneys may be, in an -nlarged sense, a judicial act .... So are all those administra-
tive duties the performance of which involves an inquiry into the existence of facts and the
application to them of rules of law." Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 280.
185. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
186. Id. at 450.
187. Id. at 455.
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instead of an administrative agency."' 88 The result of Atlas Roofing,
then, appears to be that Congress may choose the forum for adjudicating
"public rights," and the forum choice dictates procedural requisites.'8 9
The Court's recognition of congressional interests in reducing judi-
cial case loads and obtaining executive policy-making skills supports ad-
ministrative adjudication directly, and arbitration indirectly. Case loads
burden administrators as well as judges, and the executive's "special
competence" extends to choice of administrative process as well as
choice of policy. The choice of either administrative adjudication or ar-
bitration often reflects the advantages of providing a fact finder far more
expert in technical subject matter than the lay members of a jury.
The Northern Pipeline plurality did not persuasively explain why
Congress may shift federal questions out of the courts more readily than
diversity cases. 190 The Court's reliance on sovereign immunity, itself a
nineteenth century judicial construct, ' 9' is patently unrealistic. Congress
is not likely to dismantle the administrative state and restore federal ju-
risdiction to its 1850 contours, so that complainants would bring federal
questions in state court and present claims against the government to
Congress. 192 Moreover, the plurality's "the greater includes the lesser"
argument is vulnerable to theoretical rejoinders. Congress, having the
power to withhold federal jurisdiction in diversity cases, could allocate
those cases to bodies other than federal courts. A similar argument ap-
plies to arbitration: Congress, having authority under the FAA to place
adjudication entirely in private hands, may authorize arbitration within
executive branch programs.
Indeed, the plurality's formulation appears to be exactly back-
wards-article III's protections for federal judges aim principally to
ward off assaults from the other two branches, not to assure correct deci-
sions of state law. 193 If the Court is struggling to identify core judicial
188. Id.
189. In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court considered the applicability of the
seventh amendment to civil penalty actions brought in federal district court under the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982). The Court unanimously held that the right to a jury attaches to a
federal court determination of liability for penalties. In a footnote, the Court distinguished Atlas
Roofing as "holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings."
Tull, 481 U.S. at 418 n.4.
190. See Redish, supra note 182, at 208-11.
191. See generally P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 43 (1988) (dis-
cussing the origins of the sovereign immunity doctrine).
192. For a description of the shift to judicial resolution of claims against the United States, see
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-58 (1962).
193. For an argument that article III's tenure protections are also important in diversity cases,




functions that Congress cannot assign elsewhere, diversity cases seem an
odd place to begin. Of course, the plurality's doctrine had to accommo-
date some existing administrative adjudication of public rights. Cor-
rectly viewed, however, the problem is not one of labeling but rather one
of limits.
The Court has recognized several justifications for placing adjudica-
tive functions in the executive. One is the use of adjudication to form
policy. 194 The Court's doctrine of deference to an agency's judgments of
law and policy extends to the adjudicative context. 195 This deference
often permits agencies substantial latitude, because the policy-making
component of agency adjudication varies across a wide spectrum. Com-
pare the broad policy orientation of the Federal Communications Com-
mission's hearings on renewal of broadcast licenses, 196 for example, with
the narrow factual focus of a. Social Security Administration determina-
tion of an individual's disability.
197
The justification for transferring adjudication out of federal court
does not evaporate when an agency, like an arbitrator, focuses on appli-
cation of an established legal criterion to disputed facts.'98 A traditional
justification for creating agencies has been to obtain speedy and informal
adjudication by a fact finder with expertise in the subject matter. Courts
give weight to congressional judgments about the appropriateness of ad-
ministrative rather than judic-ial processes. 199 By shunting fact-intensive
adjudications to agencies or arbitrators, Congress frees the federal courts
to carry out their central responsibilities of interpreting the Constitution
and statutes.
Northern Pipeline demonstrates that formalism's broad sweep is in-
appropriate for allocations of adjudicative power among the branches. 2°°
The justification for formalism in preventing aggrandizement is likely to
be absent. 20' Functional analysis focuses the Court's attention on the
194. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Coip., 318 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1943).
195. See, eg., NLRB v. Hearst Ptblications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-32 (1944) (finding that lower
courts should uphold a NLRB determination of how a broad statutory term should apply if the
determination is supported by the record and has a reasonable basis in law).
196. See generally Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regula-
tory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169 (1978).
197. See generally I. MASHAW, supra note 35, at 23-24, 126-27.
198. For a helpful summary of administrative law distinctions between issues of fact and law, see
NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.).
199. See, eg., Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319-26 (1985)
(observing that courts should give legislatures substantial discretion in formulating procedural
processes).
200. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 629-33.
201. The other justification for formalism, drawing clear lines of political accountability, see
Bruff, supra note 133, at 502-09, suggests allocating adjudicative functions with a strong policy-
making component to the executive, to allow accountability to operate.
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policies underlying article III and permits the diverse procedural ar-
rangements that the structure of our government demands. Fortunately,
later cases have employed functionalism to curtail the implications of
Northern Pipeline.
In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,202 the Court
upheld the mandatory arbitration requirements of the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).20 3 Under the Act, man-
ufacturers wishing to register and market a pesticide must give the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) their research data on the
product's effects. The EPA considers the data for both the initial regis-
tration and later filings for similar products submitted by other manufac-
turers. Later registrants must compensate the earlier ones for use of the
data, in amounts determined by arbitration if the manufacturers cannot
agree.2° 4 A federal court can set aside an arbitrator's award only for
"fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. '205
Writing for the majority in Thomas, Justice O'Connor rejected
"doctrinaire reliance on formal categories" 20 6 as a guide to article III and
instead favored an analysis focusing on the right at issue and the congres-
sional purposes behind the scheme. The majority characterized FIFRA
as creating a compensatory right with many public characteristics. 20 7 It
concluded that Congress could authorize an agency to "allocate costs
and benefits among voluntary participants" in a regulatory program
without providing an article III adjudication. 208
Justice O'Connor interpreted Northern Pipeline as holding only that
Congress could not give a non-article III court power to decide state-law
contract actions without the litigant's consent and subject only to ordi-
nary appellate review.20 9 She rejected an argument that FIFRA had cre-
202. 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985).
203. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982). See generally Note, FIFRA Data-Cost Arbitration and
the Judicial Power: Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 609,
619-23 (1986) (discussing the Court's failure to provide a clear test for determining the extent to
which nonjudicial forums may be used to resolve such federal disputes).
204. The agency uses the AAA's roster of commercial arbitrators and its usual methods for
mutual selection by the parties, although there are certain special AAA procedures for conducting
FIFRA arbitrations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1440 app. (1988).
205. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982). The EPA can enforce compliance with the award
through sanctions, including denial of compensation or cancellation of a party's registration, as the
case may be. See id.
206. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587.
207. See id. at 589. During the previous term, the Court held the EPA's consideration of the
data to be a "public use," although the "most direct beneficiaries" of that use were the later appli-
cants. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (holding that in certain circum-
stances this public use effected a compensable taking).
208. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589.
209. See id. at 584.
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ated a "private right," explicitly disapproving the definition advanced by
the Northern Pipeline plurality insofar as it turned on whether "a dispute
is between the Government and an individual. '210 Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun concurred, abandoning any implication that
public rights cases are restric:ed to those in which the government is a
party and explaining that their Northern Pipeline position focused on the
state law nature of the claims at issue.
211
In passing, the Court squelched the Northern Pipeline plurality's
threat to the structure of the administrative state. The Court stated that
Crowell fell within mandatory article III jurisdiction because it con-
cerned a statute that replaced a common-law action.212 The Court also
recognized that judicial review of administrative adjudication is often
limited or unavailable. 213 The Thomas majority thus made clear that the
continued vitality of Crowell does not rest on outmoded doctrines requir-
ing stringent judicial review.
Turning to the use of arbitration, the Court noted Congress's need
to streamline compensation controversies. 214 It perceived a close nexus
between the use of arbitration and effective administration of the pesti-
cide registration program. The Court also emphasized the existence of
consent by the affected firms: it considered the danger of encroachment
on the judiciary's central role to be "at a minimum when no unwilling
defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement power. ' 215
The Court accepted the statute's limitations on judicial review,
which it read to allow reversal of arbitrators "who abuse or exceed their
powers or willfully misconstrue their mandate under the governing
law."' 21 6 The concurring Justices, like the majority, echoed the tradi-
tional "manifest disregard for the governing law" standard of review. 217
The Court also held that review for constitutional error was available,
alleviating any due process concerns about the extent of review.218
Thomas demonstrates the absence of clear distinctions between pub-
210. Id. at 586.
211. See id. at 595-97 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, also concurring, thought the
challengers lacked standing. Id. at 605 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 587 (O'Connor, J.).
213. See id. at 583.
214. Arbitration replaced an earlier procedure by which the EPA adjudicated compensation,
subject to judicial review. This scheme proved cumbersome and unworkable; in 1978 Congress
turned to arbitration. Id. at 571-75.
215. Id. at 591.
216. Id. at 592.
217. Id. at 601 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun and Marshall, JJ.); see Fletcher,
supra note 50, at 456.
218. The parties had abandoned due process objections to the nature of statutory review of the
arbitrations, so the Court did not formally address that issue. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592-93.
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lic and private rights in federal programs. Congress had a substantial
"public" purpose in choosing arbitration in FIFRA-to relieve the exec-
utive of tangled administrative adjudications. Congress, however, could
have shifted the compensation controversies into federal court without
offending article III. Aware of that alternative and its consequence for
judicial case loads, the Court embraced arbitration and accorded the
courts a minimal supervisory role.
Although some of the language in Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Thomas suggests that article III courts must hear common-law claims,
the Court has since modified its stance. In Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor,219 the Court upheld the authority of the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to entertain state-law counter-
claims in reparation proceedings when disgruntled customers seek
redress for brokers' violations of statutes or regulations. The Commodity
Exchange Act authorized CFTC adjudicators to decide counterclaims
arising out of transactions properly alleged in a complaint.220 Schor filed
a claim for reparations, and the defendants counterclaimed for debt.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for seven Justices relied in part on con-
sent-Schor chose the CFTC's "prompt" and "inexpensive" procedure
instead of a lawsuit.2 21 Indeed, the Court compared this option to arbi-
tration and concluded that the voluntary choice of informal procedures
minimized separation of powers concerns. 222 The Court then asked
whether the new forum exercised the "range of jurisdiction and powers
normally vested only in Article III courts" 223 and whether the latter re-
tained the "'essential attributes of judicial power.' "224 Only the juris-
diction over counterclaims differed from the usual agency model.225 The
Court saw no reason to deny agencies all pendent jurisdiction and found
federalism concerns minimal, because federal courts could have enter-
tained the claims.226 Thus, Schor suggests that agencies may resolve any
state-law claim closely related to a federal issue within their jurisdiction.
Agencies' exercise of pendent jurisdiction reduces federal court case
219. 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986).
220. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (1982); see 17 C.F.R. § 12.19 (1988).
221. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850.
222. Id. at 850-51.
223. Id. at 851.
224. Id. at 852 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, dissenting, argued that the majority was allowing the undue dilution of judicial authority in
service of legislative convenience. Id. at 861-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. The CFTC's jurisdiction was specialized, its enforcement powers limited, and its orders
enforceable only by order of the district court. Id. at 852-53 (O'Connor, J.).
226. See id. at 857-58.
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loads by resolving potential diversity cases; arbitration accompanied by
minimal judicial supervision maximizes this benefit.
In both Thomas and Schor, as in the FAA cases, the Court empha-
sized the consent of the participants as a justification for nonjudicial
processes. Schor was an easy case, because the plaintiff could choose
between a lawsuit and agency adjudication. Thomas, however, was an-
other matter. The Court strained to characterize FIFRA registrations as
"voluntary"-the choice avadlable to a chemical company is to forgo
marketing a pesticide it does not register. In the labor relations cases, the
Court inquired more carefully into consent to arbitration,22 7 especially
when the process affected important individual liberties. Indeed, at times
participants could not waive judicial process.228 Thomas, then, perhaps
heralded a looser standard of consent for federal regulatory programs,
allowing public values to offset concern for the autonomy of the regu-
lated party.229 The subject rmatter of a dispute certainly should affect the
stringency of judicial scrutiny of consent to arbitration. Nevertheless,
courts should not simply avoid an article III inquiry by employing a fic-
tion that the parties consented.
The schemes in both Thomas and Schor promoted the original pur-
pose of article III's protections: to guarantee the independence of adjudi-
cation from political pressure emanating from the executive or Congress.
In Thomas, the Court remarked that shifting from agency adjudicators to
private arbitrators "surely does not diminish the likelihood of impartial
decision-making, free from political influence. '230 Similarly, in Schor it
noted that Congress had placed adjudication in an independent agency,
which would be "relatively immune from the 'political winds that sweep
Washington.' "231 Arbitration is superior to agency adjudication in this
regard, because it increases the decider's independence.
Today it seems unlikely that Congress will run afoul of Northern
Pipeline unless the subject matter involves prized judicial responsibilities.
Also, jeopardy arises when the powers of a new tribunal (and, perhaps,
the tenure of the deciders) closely approximate those of courts. In such
227. See supra notes 79-81 and ac,.ompanying text.
228. See supra note 80.
229. In Thomas, the Court also ncted that affected companies had given some prior consent by
participating in the political comprormse that led to the arbitral scheme. Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 575 (1985). A more extreme case than Thomas in imputing consent
to arbitration is Geldermann v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 323 (7th Cir.
1987), which upheld a CFTC regulation requiring brokerage firms to submit customer complaints to
arbitration as a condition of doing business.
230. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590.
231. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 44 (1974)).
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situations, judges are likely to find interference with their core functions.
On the other hand, when expeditious process clearly serves non-article
III functions-such as ordinary program administration-the courts are
not likely to insist that Congress increase their already heavy case loads.
Therefore, arbitration should be safe from a successful article III assault
as long as Congress confines it to specialized subject matter in federal
programs with related executive functions.
C. Limiting Judicial Review
Judicial review of arbitration has always been more limited than re-
view of administrative adjudication. Nevertheless, a minimum level of
oversight of awards should be preserved. Thomas suggests that courts
will review at least the facial consistency of an arbitral award with statu-
tory criteria and constitutional norms.232 These inquiries require only a
brief statement of the basis for an award.233 They also accord with the
FAA's general criteria for review of arbitration and would not require
probing the factual basis of awards. More intensive review would de-
stroy the informality that accounts for the virtues of arbitration.
In general, courts seem most likely to reach issues that concern the
overall structure and validity of a statutory scheme rather than its appli-
cation to particular facts.234 Thus, courts routinely permit constitutional
inquiry of statutes that appear to preclude all review.235 Judges thereby
avoid reaching troubling issues about the power of Congress to insulate
administrative action completely.
The Supreme Court recently considered whether arbitration of
Medicare claims denies procedural due process.2 36 In a companion case,
United States v. Erika, Inc.,237 the Court found that Congress did not
authorize judicial review of particular awards. The preclusion, however,
covered only the processing of individual claims and not initial determi-
nations of entitlement to participate in the Medicare program.238 Simi-
larly, the Court subsequently held that the preclusion did not encompass
232. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592-93.
233. The ACUS recommends such a statement. See Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution (Recommendation No. 86-3), 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1988).
234. See Fallon, supra note 143, at 975-82.
235. See, eg., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (holding limitation on judicial re-
view in Veterans Benefit Act does not apply to questions arising under the Constitution); Bartlett v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding limitation on judicial review in Medicare Act
does not apply to constitutional challenges).
236. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); see infra subpart VI(A).
237. 456 U.S. 201, 206 (1982).
238. Id. at 207. The Court did not reach issues concerning any constitutional right to review.
See id. at 211 n.14.
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statutory issues concerning the overall method for the computation of
claims, as opposed to particular determinations under the general crite-
ria.239 So limited, the review scheme prevents "'the overloading of the
courts with trivial matters.' "240
By deferring to agency review of arbitrator's decisions, courts can
further reduce the burden o:n their dockets. Because arbitration is inap-
propriate for elaborating public-law norms, most arbitrations should be
free of substantial constitutional or statutory issues. Agencies can handle
"retail" review for miscondutct and for inconsistency with statutory stan-
dards and thereby reduce judicial case loads; the important goal is to
check the arbitrators' actions.241 If courts typically defer to interpreta-
tions of statutes by administering agencies, there seems equal reason to
defer to an agency that reviews an arbitrator.242
Forgoing judicial review of some aspects of arbitration in federal
programs is consistent with the tradition that courts do not review all
law-applying decisions that occur within the executive branch.243 The
aspects of arbitration that would escape judicial review would resemble
some kinds of executive functions that courts presently decline to review.
Like arbitration programs, these functions feature needs for expertise,
informality, and expedition; a large volume of potentially appealable ac-
tions; and the presence of methods other than judicial review for prevent-
ing abuses of discretion.
244
VI. Due Process
The allocation of adjudicative functions under federal programs
raises due process concerns about the adequacy of procedural protections
for affected persons. This Part addresses those concerns. It first looks at
the Court's due process analysis of one aspect of the Medicare program.
It then draws on those principles to suggest a general approach to pro-
tecting due process rights in arbitral schemes.
239. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675 (1986). Con-
gress later precluded this form of judicial review in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 93 4 1(a)(4 ), 100 Stat. 1874, 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(4) (Supp.
IV 1986)).
240. Erika, 456 U.S. at 210 n.13 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 33992 (1972) (statement of Sen.
Bennett)).
241. Thus, Congress might also shift determinations of the arbitrability of particular issues from
the courts to the agencies when the government is not a party.
242. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (up-
holding ICC's authority to review arbitral awards for "recurring or otherwise significant issues of
general importance").
243. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-32 (1985); Young, supra note 182, at 795-801.
244. See Saferstein, Nonreviewabiity: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discre-
tion", 82 HARv. L. REv. 367, 377-95 (1968).
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A. Schweiker v. McClure and General Due Process
In Schweiker v. McClure,245 a unanimous Court upheld the author-
ity of private insurance carriers to resolve disputed Medicare claims
without a right of appeal. The program at issue in McClure is financed
by federal appropriations and premiums from participants and is a vol-
untary supplement to basic Medicare that covers most of the cost of cer-
tain medical services. As the Court noted, the program resembles
subsidized private insurance on a massive scale: in one year there were
27 million participants, 10 billion dollars paid in benefits, and 158 mil-
lion claims.
246
Congress authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to contract with private insurers, such as Blue Cross, to adminis-
ter these claims payments. 247 HHS pays administrative costs and speci-
fies the claims process. Upon receiving a claim, the carrier makes an
initial determination of the reasonableness of the charge for covered serv-
ices. If the claim is denied, the claimant is allowed a de novo redetermi-
nation on a written appeal to a new decider. If the claim is for more than
one hundred dollars, a claimant who is still dissatisfied may receive an
oral hearing in front of a carrier employee who was not involved in the
prior decisions and who writes a decision based on the record. 248 At the
time McClure was decided, the claimant received no further appeal.249
The Court began by rejecting a due process charge of bias on the
part of the deciders. It found that the carriers and their employees had
no financial interest in denying claims.250 The Court then turned to the
argument that due process requires additional administrative or judicial
review by a government officer. Applying the familiar criteria of Ma-
thews v. Eldridge,251 the Court assumed that the weight of the private
245. 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).
246. See id. at 190.
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(a) (1982).
248. See id. § 1395u(b).
249. Congress has since amended this statute to grant beneficiaries with claims over $500 a
hearing before an administrative law judge; those with claims over $1000 also receive judicial review.
Claims between $100 and $500 are decided as before. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9341(a)(1)(C), 100 Stat. 1874, 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(2)
(Supp. IV 1986)).
250. McClure, 456 U.S. at 196-97.
251. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-




interest was "considerable. ' 25 2 The weight of the government's interest
in efficiency was unclear, but the Court assumed that providing review
by an administrative law judge would not be "unduly burdensome. '2
53
Focusing on the risk of erroneous decision and the value of additional
process, the Court stressed the HHS requirements that deciders be both
qualified to conduct hearings on medical matters and thoroughly familiar
with the program and its governing law and policy.254 Because of these
requirements, the Court per:eived no constitutional deficiencies in the
adjudicative procedures nor any need that the deciders be attorneys.
255
B. Analysis of the Particular Attributes of Arbitral Schemes
Voluntary arbitration should usually satisfy due process criteria. In
general, a party's consent to a particular procedure is the best guarantee
of fairness, if the alternative,,, are also acceptable. (Here, the alternative
would be ordinary administrative process.) Of course, there are limits to
what a citizen may bargain away for the benefits of an expeditious deci-
sion.256 To steer clear of those limits, Congress should avoid authorizing
arbitration for disputes in which constitutional or statutory rights are
evolving and need the special contributions of both administrators and
judges.
Some arbitration schemes involve consent of a different kind. As in
McClure, participation in a. federal program may be voluntary, even
though there is no assent to arbitral techniques. Courts should not relax
their inquiry into procedural fairness in these situations. The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, checkered as its history may be, sets limits
on the government's power to bargain for citizens' rights with program
benefits. 257 Thus, in McClure it was significant that the underlying enti-
tlement to participate in Medicare was not subject to arbitration, unlike
the amount of particular elzims. McClure thereby accords with the El-
dridge formulation, under which the acceptability of arbitration depends
to a large extent on an individual's interest in a program's benefits.
An important consideration from the functional portion of the El-
dridge calculus is whether the arbitral scheme assures the neutrality and
252. McClure, 456 U.S. at 198.
253. Id. The district court decision had called for a de novo hearing before an administrative
law judge. Id. at 195. The Court did not separately consider whether due process might require
more limited administrative review, such as review of the decider's written decision.
254. See id. at 198-200.
255. See id. at 199 n.4.
256. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
257. See generally Kreimer, 4llocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1327-33 (1984) (discussing the historical origins and development of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
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competence of the decider. Recall Judge Friendly's point that assurances
of neutrality reduce the need for other procedural safeguards. 258 Mc-
Clure shows that the Court does not regard agency deciders as necessar-
ily fairer or more reliable than private ones.
259
In McClure, as in Eldridge, some guarantees of neutrality stem from
the functions assigned to the decider. These nonadversarial hearings do
not include government representation, and the decider must assist the
private applicant in developing the case.260 In such an atmosphere, any
incentive to favor one side probably benefits the claimant. The McClure
Court mentioned the government's interest in avoiding overpayment of
claims only in passing-in the context of rejecting a bias claim based on
HHS attempts to encourage carriers to detect overpayments. 26' This
suggests that agencies should avoid instructions to arbitrators that seem
to promote bias for either side.
The Court seems prepared to accept practical considerations of
background and training, without regard to formal affiliation or status,
as guarantees of decider competency. 262 The Court has also indicated
that the need for lawyers in federal programs turns on the extent to
which formal rules of evidence apply and on the need for other kinds of
expertise in the decider. For example, the Court effectively excluded
lawyers from Veterans Administration claims proceedings by upholding
a ten-dollar fee limit: "Simple factual questions are capable of resolution
in a nonadversarial context, and it is less than crystal clear why lawyers
must be available to identify possible errors in medical judgment.
' 263
Under any particular program, the appropriateness of arbitral pro-
cess depends on the nature of the participants and the issues. In Gray
Panthers v. Schweiker,264 for example, the court held that the Medicare
procedure for claims under one hundred dollars failed to satisfy due pro-
cess in two respects. First, notice of procedural options needed to be
adapted to the capacities of elderly and infirm claimants.265 Second, oral
hearings were necessary for claims raising issues of credibility.266 It suf-
ficed, however, to shape the process to accommodate "'the generality of
258. See supra text accompanying note 168.
259. See McClure, 456 U.S. at 197 & n.l1.
260. Id. at 197 n.l1.
261. See id. at 196 n.9.
262. See id. 198-200 (upholding selection criteria for deciders because they included a require-
ment of "thorough knowledge" of the Medicare program, although they did not require a decider to
hold a law degree).
263. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985).





cases, not the rare exceptions.' ",267
The fairness of arbitration derives partly from the specificity of the
governing standard. A standard should be specific enough to meet the
primary needs of the parties, the arbitrator, and the reviewing entities.
The parties need enough information to exercise meaningful consent to
the use of arbitration and to present their cases. The arbitrators need
enough guidance to make awards that will be consistent with each other.
The reviewing entities must be able to judge the facial validity of awards.
In Thomas, arbitrators were -to provide "compensation" to pesticide reg-
istrants for the use of their data.268 The vagueness of this standard raised
fundamental questions: for example, does it mean the cost of creating
the data or the value to the later registrant?269 An agency presented with
such a vague statutory directive should elaborate it through rulemaking
before asking arbitrators to apply it.270
Provisions for review by an agency or a court under the standards of
the FAA also help to ensure the accuracy of arbitrations. Review fo-
cuses on the two most important ways in which arbitration can go
awry-loss of neutrality in the decider and an award exceeding the
bounds of the ex ante expectations of the parties. It would be difficult to
provide added checks without radically formalizing the process.
The strength of the government's interest in informality varies. It is
relatively great in high volume, small dollar contexts, such as Medicare,
in which fact questions predominate. When expeditious processes are
available, it is possible to devote more resources to the formal processes
needed for resolution of policy or formation of precedent. Insofar as the
government's fiscal interest concerns payment of awards as well as provi-
sion of process, however, tae government's advantage is not a simple
matter of minimizing procedural costs. Instead, the government should
seek a process that optimally balances accuracy and cost. Such a balance
is a peculiarly executive function, and as Eldridge emphasizes, the
agency's choice of process is entitled to deference by a court weighing the
dictates of due process.
271
267. Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
268. The Court did not reach a delegation doctrine challenge to the adequacy of this standard.
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985).
269. See PPG Indus. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 637 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D.D.C. 1986) (upholding the
standard and stating that the arbitrator has discretion to choose the compensation formula).
270. This elaboration would provide at least a partial response to the argument by Fallon, supra
note 143, at 991, that Thomas was wrongly decided because decisions "of federal law" were commit-
ted to arbitrators, with very limited judicial review.
271. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
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VII. Executive Branch Supervision
Execution of the laws typically entails a complex mix of law-inter-
preting, policy making, and fact-finding.272 Much execution occurs
through adjudication, performed by a variety of processes. The accepta-
bility of arbitration depends in large part on the extent to which Con-
gress or the executive may transfer these decisions to private arbitrators,
consistent with the Constitution's vesting of "[t]he executive Power" in
the President and his subordinates. 273 Executive preference for a delega-
tion may mute a constitutional inquiry, but it will not foreclose one, be-
cause article II joins responsibility with power in its command to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. '274
A. Adjudicative Activities and Executive Responsibility
The President's constitutional powers "are not fixed but fluctu-
ate,"'275 depending on the context in which they are considered. The ex-
tent of presidential authority to supervise administration depends on
several variables: subject matter, government structure, and proce-
dure.276 These variables affect relationships between the executive and
private deciders, interacting to yield a judgment about appropriate kinds
of supervision for particular functions. Arbitration should satisfy article
II concerns if the structure and procedure used allow executive supervi-
sion appropriate to the particular context.
1. Subject Matter. -The first variable is subject matter, as it relates
to the text and structure of the Constitution. A President's strongest
powers derive directly from the Constitution, as in foreign affairs,
whereas the powers are at their weakest when actions affect individual
liberties that enjoy their own constitutional protection. Our "political
Constitution" plays a role here. Decisions that have a relatively high
policy content implicate the President's unique national political constit-
uency 277 and maximize the need for supervision. 27 By contrast, the ap-
272. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1986).
273. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
274. Id. § 3.
275. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
276. See generally Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451,
488-508 (1979) (employing a functional analysis to evaluate the authority for presidential initiatives).
277. See Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1411 (1975)
(explaining that the President's unique ability to intervene in critical situations derives from being
the only nationally elected officer).
278. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing "the basic need
of the President and his White House staff to monitor the consistency of executive agency regula-
tions with Administration policy").
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plication of policy to particular individuals introduces a competing
constitutional value-due process.
279
Administrators frequently make policy through adjudication; 280 the
President, therefore, has a substantial claim to overall supervision, not
including intervention in a particular pending case.28' Of course, the pol-
icy-making content of adjudication varies substantially. 282 For example,
in McClure no one thought to raise article II objections to the arbitration
of Medicare claims, presumably because of their fact intensiveness.
2. Structure. -Congress imposes limits on executive oversight, but
the ultimate reach of this ozngressional power has always been uncer-
tain.283 To minimize executive oversight, Congress allocates adjudicative
functions to federal courts, legislative courts, or independent agencies. 284
Courts have honored these attempts to insulate adjudication from presi-
dential influence. The cases establishing the special constitutional status
of independent agencies emphasize the due process concerns of agency
decision makers. 285 The curTent debate over the constitutional status of
these agencies centers on presidential authority to supervise their policy-
making functions.2 86 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continues to treat
the independent agencies as a viable part of government. 28 7
279. Due process imposes little constraint on general policy making. See Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 542 & n.16 (1978) (stating
that the Constitution does not require additional procedural devices in rulemaking proceedings).
280. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-93 (1974) (recognizing that adminis-
trators must exercise powers on a case-by-case basis to resolve specialized problems); SEC v. Che-
nery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (allowing administrators to announce new principles in
resolving issues not expressly covered by an existing administrative rule).
281. See ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 2, at 79, 82.
282. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
283. See generally M. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY: STUDIES IN LEGISLA-
TIVE SUPERVISION 16-18 (1976) (noting the fluctuations in Congress's exercise of power over agen-
cies in the 1960s and 1970s); G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 117-31 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing executive supervision of policy making by administrative
agencies).
284. Of course, executive power over these entities varies, but the President retains his appoint-
ment power for all of them.
285. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the President cannot
remove a member of the War Claims Commission without cause); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 623 (1935) (holding that the President cannot remove a member of the Federal
Trade Commission without cause).
286. See Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 519, 519-21 (1987) (discussing the uncer-
tain place of agencies in the constitutional order); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV.
41, 45 (discussing the implications of growing presidential power over administrative agencies).
287. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1988) (holding that Congress may
restrict President's power to remove officers, absent conflict with President's performance of his
constitutional duties); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986)
(praising independence of CFTC as Ia bulwark to fairness of adjudication); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (discussing the independence of agencies and the inability of Congress to re-
move members except for impeachable offenses).
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3. Procedure. -- Congress also affects presidential power by specify-
ing agency procedure. Formal adjudication enjoys constitutional288 and
statutory289 protections from outside interference by anyone, including
the President. Rulemaking, on the other hand, is subject to increasingly
ambitious executive management. 290 Informal adjudication occupies a
gray area in which Congress often fails to specify procedures, leaving the
courts to define the permissibility of outside contacts.
291
4. Applying the Constitutional Criteria.-The Supreme Court has
emphasized since Crowell that federal courts must retain a relationship to
executive adjudication that preserves the rule of law.292 This require-
ment dominates the doctrines that define judicial review of administra-
tive action and has led to a system in which executive oversight of
adjudication is usually shared with the judiciary.293 Consequently, it is
easy to confuse the sufficiency of governmental control of adjudication
with the sufficiency of executive control to meet the distinctive needs of
the executive branch.
Where, then, is the boundary between performance or oversight of
adjudication that Congress may grant the executive and that which it
must grant the executive? The Supreme Court's definition of "execu-
tion" for purposes of forbidding Congress from intruding on executive
prerogative is overbroad: "Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the
law."'294 Manifestly, this formulation also encompasses the duties of fed-
eral courts. A focus on "policy making" is also oversimplified, because
federal courts make policy every day by interpreting statutes-for exam-
ple, by forming antitrust policy under the vague charter of the Sherman
Act. 295
288. See Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966) (stating that congressional
intervention in agency adjudicative functions raises concerns about the constitutional right to due
process).
289. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1982).
290. See generally Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Decision-Making: An Analysis of Executive
Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 1195, 1195-97 (1981) (discussing presidential requirements that
agencies support rules with cost-benefit analyses).
291. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding the legal-
ity of unrecorded contacts with rule makers by both executive and congressional officers); D.C.
Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding congressional influence that
produces agency decision based on factors not made relevant by statute is grounds for remand), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
292. See Fallon, supra note 143, at 938-45 (arguing that preservation ofjudicial review of execu-
tive action satisfies article III interests).
293. Id. at 923-26.
294. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
295. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see, eg., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405,416
(1962) (holding that despite the vagueness of the Sherman Act, a corporate officer is subject to
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Recall the Court's struggle to define adjudicative functions that may
be placed in the executive branch.296 The policy component of "public
rights" meant that Congress could, but need not, allocate them to the
executive.297 Plainly, within wide limits Congress may decide whether
adjudication should be performed in a federal court, an executive agency,
or a constitutional hybrid, such as a legislative court or independent
agency. Moreover, consider'ing that Congress may require formal adjudi-
cative procedure wherever it places decision-making authority, the "or-
ganization chart" aspects of the placement do not necessarily make a
sharp difference.
Congress, however, may insulate a function from the oversight of all
three constitutional branches in a way that hampers political accounta-
bility or allows arbitrariness. Courts frequently approach this question
as a due process issue of the permissibility of private delegations. 298
These delegations also raise a distinct question relating to executive su-
pervision. Some functions are neither reviewable in court nor readily
amenable to effective congressional oversight. Examples include foreign
affairs and monetary policy making. For such functions, the nature and
extent of executive supervision determines the sufficiency of governmen-
tal control. Therefore, weak ties to the executive are less justifiable if
oversight by the other branches is disabled and more justifiable if it
survives.
When Congress authorizes or requires a delegation to arbitrators, its
allocative decision merits deference, as would the alternatives of delegat-
ing to judges or executives. The amenability of arbitration to judicial or
executive review of the kinds outlined above299 provides a legitimating
element of governmental control.
5. Neutral Deciders and Public Policy.-Arbitration in government
programs raises special considerations relating to both executive power
and due process. Arbitration promotes due process because it alleviates
bias problems that attend administrative adjudication. Yet this gain may
be won at the cost of sacrificing executive responsibility for policy. Con-
gress may accommodate these constitutional values by retaining execu-
tive control of policy making and allocating some functions of policy
prosecution regardless of whether he was acting in a representative capacity); cf. Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 537-38 (1948) (noting that the Court has rejected the argument that the Sher-
man Act is unconstitutionally vague).
296. See supra subpart V(A).
297. See supra subpart V(B).
298. See supra Part VI.
299. See supra sections VII(A)(l)-(3).
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application to private neutrals. This principle provides a valuable gen-
eral guideline but does not create a simple solution, because the line be-
tween making and applying policy is indistinct. In addition, it may be
desirable for arbitrators to discharge a limited role in generating policy,
and certainly some fact-finding should remain in executive hands. These
judgments hinge on the particular contexts discussed below.
Government arbitration always affects policy in some way. At a
minimum, awards constrain the options subsequently open to adminis-
trators. Arbitration of money claims against the government, as in
Medicare, implicates budgetary concerns. Arbitration in public em-
ployee labor relations determines aspects of personnel policy. Even arbi-
tration between private parties indirectly affects the affiliated federal
program. Success or failure of the FIFRA arbitrations in Thomas, for
example, should eventually impinge on the pace of pesticide registrations.
This Article's analysis of the FAA cases stresses the contract basis
of the Court's modern approach to arbitration.3°° Consent is also rele-
vant to the acceptability of arbitration in federal programs. 301 Neverthe-
less, the impossibility of excluding all policy effects raises special
concerns for affected third parties, who have not consented to the use of
private deciders. If kept within limits, the presence of third-party effects
should not rule out arbitration.
Arbitration reduces executive power, but its effects should be kept in
perspective. Comparison of a private delegation with the government
function it displaces must include consideration of the legal constraints
on that function, to see how much discretion the executive actually loses
and to what extent the executive retains control over arbitration.
A brief look at the use of ADR techniques in rulemaking demon-
strates these principles. Rulemaking draws the President's supervisory
role directly into question, because it concerns generalized policy.
30 2
Nevertheless, private groups influence rule makers. Although the origi-
nal purpose of the APA's notice and comment procedures was only to
provide affected persons an opportunity to educate the policy makers, 303
administrative law presently pursues a more ambitious goal-to use di-
verse outside pressures to encourage rule makers to follow the public
300. See supra subpart II(B).
301. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
302. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 277, at 1411 (discussing the President's unique situation
and capability to act quickly in formulating and articulating national policy goals).
303. See Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards
of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM.




Under the ACUS recommendation on negotiated rulemaking, pri-
vate groups negotiate a proposed rule, which then undergoes the usual
notice and comment process. This process does not differ sharply from
the bargaining that occurs informally under notice and comment proce-
dures.30 5 Private parties have a substantial influence on the process, but
final policy decisions remain with the government.30 6 Similarly, delega-
tion to arbitrators need not equal abdication, because constraints on arbi-
tration can satisfy the executive's supervisory needs. As administrative
adjudication demonstrates, much depends on the program's structure,
which is the topic of the next subpart.
B. The Scope of the Appointments Clause
In Buckley v. Valeo,307 the Supreme Court held that Congress could
not appoint members of the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The
Court read the appointments clause30 8 to govern the selection of anyone
"exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States. ' 30 9 In defining that phrase, the Court distinguished informa-
tional and investigative functions, which need not be performed by "Of-
ficers of the United States," from the FEC's enforcement powers-such
as litigating, rulemaking, and adjudicating-which could only be per-
formed by officers or their employees.
310
Buckley is a formalist opinion with no obvious limits to its logic. 311
A plausible interpretation is that it requires all adjudicative activities to
be kept in the hands of federal employees. Nevertheless, the context of
the case framed the Court's distinctions. The Court considered whether
Congress could assume the :President's appointments power, not whether
304. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO FED-
ERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 95-99 (1983) (discussing the involvement of outside groups in the
rulemaking process).
305. Moreover, modem agencies often employ private consultants in rulemaking and may rely
substantially on them in the deliberative process as long as the agencies do not abdicate the ultimate
statutory responsibility for decision. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1217 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
306. See, e.g., 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-t (1988) ("The final responsibility for issuing the rule would
remain with the agency."); see also Harter, supra note 7, at 109 (suggesting that because the agency
retains final rulemaking authority, this type of regulatory negotiation does not constitute an "imper-
missible delegation of governmental authority to a private group").
307. 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).
308. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. Z.
309. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
310. The Court noted that employees are "lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the
United States." Id. at 126 n.162.
311. See Bruff, supra note 133, at 500 (arguing that Buckley was primarily formalist and that the
Court did not address Congress's abi:ity to exclude the President from a supervisory role).
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it could authorize or require the delegation to private parties of some
functions the executive could perform. The problem of congressional ag-
grandizement disappears when Congress allocates the appointment
power elsewhere.312 The need to prevent interference with core functions
remains and requires an inquiry into whether the President lacks supervi-
sory powers necessary to oversee the execution of the laws.
313
The Buckley Court adopted a broad definition of the executive activ-
ities that are subject to the appointments clause. The Court emphasized
that execution of the laws includes diverse functions typical of all three
constitutional branches. 314 Granted, but Buckley had no occasion to
consider less than a complete displacement of power to select deciders.
315
Nor did the Court consider constitutional values other than the separa-
tion of powers, such as due process. Thus, Buckley does not resolve the
question of most interest here: What minimum relationships between an
officer and a decider are necessary to satisfy concerns related to the ap-
pointments clause?
Two possible approaches may satisfy Buckley. First, courts could
ask only whether a decider is technically a government employee. Under
this approach, arbitrators could be government employees from any
agency not involved in a particular dispute. The purpose would be to
obtain neutrality while keeping discretion in government hands. Yet if
Buckley is meant to preserve accountability for and control of execution
by executive officers, it is not the formal affiliation of an arbitrator with
the government that matters. Instead, the officer having statutory re-
sponsibility for administering the program must retain control.
Thus, courts could ask a more focused question: Is the particular
activity in question sufficiently controlled by the responsible officer?
316
312. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620-21 (1988); see also Melcher v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 520 (D.D.C. 1986) (distinguishing both Buckley and Bowsher as
involving "attempts to enlarge the legislative authority at the expense of that of the Executive
Branch"), affrd, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988).
313. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
314. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41.
315. For example, nothing in Buckley forbids exposing an officer to private influence, as long as
the officer retains the power to decide. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,
388 (1940) (holding that coal producers may propose minimum prices to agency, which can approve,
disapprove, or modify them).
316. This inquiry is illustrated by Melcher, 644 F. Supp. at 523, which involved the formation of
monetary policy by the FOMC. The district court considered the FOMC's status under Buckley.
Seven members (the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) are unquestionably "Of-
ficers of the United States." The other five are private bankers selected by the boards of directors of
the regional Federal Reserve Banks. The court declined to characterize the private members of the
FOMC as government officers, see id. at 519, although the Board of Governors supervises them in
their other capacity as officers of the various Reserve Banks. The court pointed to the absence of
any clear authority for the supervision of these individuals in their role as FOMC members. Id.
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This is the appropriate inquiry, because it isolates the executive's supervi-
sory needs. Recognizing the variety of possible relationships between the
executive and its delegates, such as part-time employment and independ-
ent contractor status, this approach would avoid considering only formal
appointment or full-time employment. Courts could assess each relation-
ship to determine the extent to which an officer controls delegated
discretion.
Available methods of controlling arbitration can meet the execu-
tive's constitutional responsibilities. 317 Absent these controls, the consti-
tutionality of federal arbitration will not be preserved by the formal
status of the arbitrator as an officer or employee of the United States,
because that status will lack a nexus to the performance of delegated
governmental powers. On the other hand, the presence of the controls
prevents interference with core executive functions.
C. Selecting Arbitration and Arbitrators
The appropriateness of arbitration for resolving a particular type of
dispute depends on a variety of factors, including the identity of the par-
ties, the nature of their interests, the issues raised, and expressed congres-
sional goals. This subpar: examines the interrelationships of these
factors in various contexts.
Congress frequently authorizes but does not require agencies to re-
sort to arbitration when the government is a party to the controversy.318
Voluntary arbitration of such disputes allows agencies to satisfy execu-
tive interests, whether the choice of procedure occurs before or after a
controversy arises. The primary executive interest is efficiency. By refer-
ring some claims to a third party for expeditious handling, an officer
minimizes process costs and. saves time for more important cases. Arbi-
tration also promotes efficiency indirectly by relying on a neutral decider
and thereby increasing the acceptability of outcomes and reducing ap-
peals. Referral of claims against the government also addresses a second
concern--due process values-by avoiding undue interest, or an appear-
ance of it, in the outcome.
In certain contexts, such as the determination of minor Medicare
claims, the nature of the issues and the governmental interest in effi-
ciency are such that arbitration is particularly appropriate. Here, Con-
gress should have the power to make arbitration mandatory. Indeed,
317. See infra notes 333-38 and a.companying text.
318. The ACUS recommends mandatory arbitration only for disputes between private parties




Arbitration in Federal Programs
Congress typically specifies procedures for administrative adjudication.
Arbitration, of course, offers the unique consideration of some loss of
executive control over policy effects of the process. Nevertheless, the ex-
ecutive does not ordinarily enjoy unrestricted dominion even for policy,
and requiring certain methods for selecting and supervising arbitrators
should preserve opportunities for the executive to control the formation
of policy and to influence its application.
319
When the government acts only as arbiter of disputes between citi-
zens, as in securities arbitration, the need for executive choice of process
declines. Nevertheless, the executive retains responsibilities that arise
out of the public purposes underlying the related administrative pro-
gram. The nature of the obligation can be seen in the FAA cases, in
which the Court held that contract values can support the acceptability
of arbitration.320 The basis of these decisions was the freedom of con-
tract notion that parties can negotiate for any dispute resolution proce-
dure they desire. Even in such formally voluntary arbitral programs the
executive should monitor the relative bargaining power of the parties to
determine the genuineness of consent to arbitration. To the extent
doubts arise about consent, the executive should use its supervisory pow-
ers to adjust the nature of arbitration in pursuit of fairness-for example,
by specifying the qualifications for arbitrators.321 Mandatory arbitration,
as in FIFRA, presents heightened responsibilities of this kind. Executive
control of the process can forestall fears that one party will oppress
another.
3 22
For programs in which the executive has a substantial interest in
arbitration, methods of structuring the scheme and selecting arbitrators
can reflect that interest in a compromise with strict neutrality. The legal-
ity of a private delegation typically depends on whether a court con-
cludes that the composition of the deciding group represents the interests
affected.3 23 Persons selecting private deciders, however, frequently must
weigh the benefits of expertise in the subject matter against the costs to
neutrality from the source of the expertise.3 24 Hence, balance, rather
319. See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
320. See supra subpart II(B).
321. See, eg., J. MURRAY, A. RAU & E. SHERMAN, supra note 13, at 523 (noting that the SEC,
in response to criticism contained in the dissenting opinion in Shearson/American Express v. Mc-
Mahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346-59 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), was
considering changes to assure arbitral impartiality in the securities industry).
322. Such fears appear to be the basis for many of the private delegation decisions, such as
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See supra subpart III(A).
323. Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1871, 1883 & n.66 (1981).
324. One example is prior service in the agency or industry. The ACUS has recognized the
inevitability of these trade-offs in its recommendation on acquiring the services of ADR neutrals.
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than unalloyed neutrality, should be the predominant goal of arbitral
schemes.
There are several ways to pursue balance in arbitration. First, a
mixed public/private body can determine whether to arbitrate. Arbitra-
tion of contract impasses with federal workers, for example, occurs on
the approval of the Federal. Service Impasses Panel, a part-time body
composed partly of government employees.325 This approach reflects the
policy orientation of "interest" arbitration, which resolves distributional
issues between the parties on a prospective basis. 326 Such prior approval
is typically unnecessary when policy concerns are not in issue, as in
"grievance" arbitration, which considers rights under preexisting
arrangements.
Second, the composition of multimember panels can reflect interests
in appropriate proportions.317 Such a scheme is employed to resolve la-
bor disputes in the United States Postal Service. An arbitral board com-
posed of one member selected by the Service, one by the union, and a
third selected by the other two members, adjudicates bargaining impasses
between the Service and its employees.328 The Department of Education
also employs mixed panels, formed of a minority of federal employees
and a majority of private members, to adjudicate certain disputes with its
grant recipients. 3
29
Moreover, even single-sarbitrator schemes can reflect the preferences
of both sides. In commerciel arbitration, the AAA sends a list of names
to the parties, who strike those to whom they object and number the
others in order of preference. The AAA selects the arbitrator according
See 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-8 (1988). See gtnerally G. RUTTINGER, ACQUIRING THE SERVICES OF NEU-
TRALS FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTES RESOLUTION AND NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: REPORT
FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1986) (suggesting potential cri-
teria for establishing qualifications for ADR neutrals).
325. See 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (1982).
326. See generally Craver, supra note 19, at 559-61 (arguing that "interest" arbitration involves
issues that can drastically affect the services received by the public and the expenditure of govern-
mental revenues); Kanowitz, supra note 25, at 244-50 (arguing that "interest" arbitration reduces the
number and scope of socially disruptive economic disturbances); Note, Binding Interest Arbitration
in the Public Sector: Is it Constitutional?, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 819-21 (1977) (asserting
that binding interest arbitration statutes should be carefully worded to harmonize the conflicting
interests of the general public, public employers, and public employees).
327. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 523 (D.D.C. 1986) (stating
that Buckley concerns are alleviated by the presence of a government majority on the FOMC), aff'd,
836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988).
328. See 39 U.S.C. § 1207 (1982). Falling agreement on selection of a third member, the Direc-
tor of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service chooses one. Id. § 1207(c)(1).
329. See 20 U.S.C. § 1234(c) (1982). See generally B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW § 54.05(2)(a) (1987) (discussing the structure and staffing of the Education Appeal
Board).
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to mutual preference. 330 Federal agencies borrow these practices, some-
times by direct referral to the AAA.
331
These techniques furnish the executive with sufficient tools to bal-
ance supervisory and neutrality concerns that arise in the selection of
deciders. Compare these procedures with ordinary administrative adju-
dication, which administrative law judges usually perform in the first in-
stance. For either adjudication or arbitration, an agency may consider
the overall neutrality and competence of the pool of deciders when decid-
ing whether to utilize their services instead of alternative processes. But
an agency sometimes has more power to select a private decider than a
public one, because in arbitration agencies can influence the choice of
a decider for a particular case, whereas ALJs usually rotate in
assignments. 332
D. Supervising Arbitrators
Although presidential authority to supervise independent agencies
and adjudicators is limited, the President enjoys the constitutional power
to appoint the deciders and retains a general interest in their perform-
ance. 333 Accordingly, arbitration in federal programs should be subject
to two kinds of executive monitoring. First, the program should contain
some overall scrutiny to determine whether the scheme meets expecta-
tions. Like any procedure, arbitration is more successful for some dis-
putes than others.334 In the present era of experimentation with ADR
techniques, the executive has a continuing monitoring responsibility.
Federal arbitration schemes often concern large stakes, such as millions
of dollars of aggregate expenditures of public or private money. For
330. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 15, at 34. The person selected must
disclose "any circumstances likely to affect impartiality" and is subject to disqualification by the
AAA. Id. at 35. Similarly, the Court has read the FAA to require disclosure of possible bias. See,
e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) (stating
that provisions authorizing courts to vacate fraudulent awards "show a desire of Congress to provide
not merely for any arbitration but for an impartial one").
331. See, eg., 29 C.F.R. § 1440 app. (1988) (pesticide registrations); 40 C.F.R. § 305.31 (1987)
(Superfund), revoked, 52 Fed. Reg. 33812 (1987).
332. See 5 C.F.R. § 930.212 (1988). The Supreme Court, however, has approved some agency
discretion to match an ALU's background to the subject matter. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial
Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1953) (approving a rotation scheme of ALJs on the
basis of their ability to handle complex and difficult cases).
333. See SuBcoMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 33 (Comm. Print 1960): "The
congestion of the dockets of the agencies, the delays incident to the disposition of cases, the failure to
evolve policies pursuant to basic statutory requirements are all a part of the President's constitu-
tional concern to see that the laws are faithfully executed."
334. See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 918-34 (1979)
(emphasizing the connection between the collective bargaining relationship and the success of labor
arbitration).
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some arbitral programs, then, "wholesale" review is more important to
the executive than "retail" review of a particular decision. Of course,
oversight does have its perils; when the government is a party to arbitra-
tion, monitoring must steer a careful course, assessing the overall accu-
racy of the process without intervening in particular cases.
335
Second, agencies must exercise some control over the conduct of
particular arbitrations by providing a standard for decision and by re-
viewing awards to ensure fidelity to it.336 Ordinarily, an agency elabo-
rates its statutory standards through rulemaking. The executive thus
controls arbitration even when statutes mandate it. 37 Of course, the
specificity of standards should vary with the subject matter. Instructions
should be more detailed for relatively policy-laden subjects (such as in-
terest arbitration in labor relations) than for more fact-intensive ones.338
In general, the FAA criteria are suited to review of arbitration either
in the agency or in district court.339 Agency review under FAA stan-
dards would not be as stringent as review of much administrative adjudi-
cation, because of the latter's structure to reflect a greater policy
content.34° When arbitral schemes have relatively large effects on agency
335. Several commentators have suggested a similar type of limited review of AL performance.
See Lubbers, supra note 163, at 125-26 (acknowledging the necessity of an independent corps of
ALJs, but calling for objective performance evaluations based on statistical data drawn from cases
decided over a significant time period); Note, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation,
and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 591, 594 (1986) (noting the delicate balance that AL~s must tread in adjudicating agency
policies and in remaining independent of agencies); cf. Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heck-
ler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1140-41 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that generalized executive review of ALU
performance is legitimate as long as it does not skew the outcome of particular adjudications).
336. Additionally, if an arbitrator xceeds delegated authority in a pending case, an agency may
seek redress by invoking the familiar jurisdiction of the courts to determine an arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
337. Professor Fallon has argued that Thomas was wrongly decided, because it delegated author-
ity to arbitrators to decide issues of "law." See Fallon, supra note 143, at 991. The vague standard
at issue in Thomas certainly needed elaboration. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. If
an agency appropriately confines arbitral discretion by specifying the content of the governing norm,
there should be no need to invalidate the entire scheme.
338. See Craver, supra note 19, at 566-67, for examples of varying criteria used for interest arbi-
tration. Recent state cases considering the validity of private delegations have often concerned pub-
lic employee interest arbitration. Mos-: courts have upheld these schemes against delegation attacks.
See, eg., City of Richfield v. International Firefighters Ass'n, 276 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1979)
(holding that delegation to arbitrators is constitutional if founded on a definite policy); State v. City
of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300-01 (Wyo. 1968) (stating that functions are delegable if the delegate
executes previously determined law). Other cases have invalidated such schemes. See, eg., Greeley
Police Union v. Greeley City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 422, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (1976) (holding delega-
tion unconstitutional in the absence o' public accountability); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n
of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 789-90 (Utah 1977) (same).
339. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). The ACUS recommendation facilitates this limited review by
calling for a brief, informal discussion of the factual and legal basis for an award. See I C.F.R.
§ 305.86-3 (1988).
340. Agencies may overturn AUJ decisions readily, as long as substantial evidence supports the
final decision. E.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Co., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955) (clarifying that
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policy-for example, in interest arbitration with federal employees-
agency review for facial legality of the award must encompass a judg-
ment that the policy effects are acceptable. 341 In this way, agencies can
accommodate Buckley's implication that executive officers must always
be accountable for public policy. Even in non-"policy" contexts, exami-
nation of particular awards should aid the search for recurring problems.
In arbitration, the executive loses ordinary fact review but gains the
speedier resolution of disputes. More intensive fact review would vitiate
the distinctive advantages of arbitration by forcing arbitrators to provide
the procedural formalities necessary to build a suitable record. Never-
theless, a limited review under FAA criteria should help agencies to dis-
charge their responsibilities to supervise arbitration.3 42 An agency can
perceive problems far more easily than district judges scattered around
the country, each of whom sees an occasional case presenting part of the
spectrum. Moreover, an agency's ordinary rulemaking powers offer
much more flexibility than federal courts possess to shape an arbitral
program in response to developments. If agencies perform this "retail"
review, there would be no need for judicial duplication, although courts
could still examine issues concerning the "wholesale" validity of the
scheme.
E. Arbitration and Enforcement Functions
The functions that Buckley denied to congressional appointees all
involved the governmental coercion of primary conduct. Perhaps that
role involves responsibilities that the executive may never delegate. The
differences between coercive and noncoercive governmental action, how-
ever, are easy to exaggerate. As economists are quick to note, both the
carrot and the stick influence behavior. Nevertheless, legal controls on
government monitor coercive activities most closely.3 43 Functional anal-
ysis gives some weight to the degree of coercion present in an activity,
without resting exclusively on that factor. The diverse subject matter of
the strict "clearly erroneous" rule does not apply to an examiner's findings and that an agency may
overrule an examiner so long as it does so based on substantial evidence). Indeed, final adjudicative
authority frequently vests in the political executives at the head of the agency. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (holding that the choice to adjudicate lies in the first
instance within the NLRB's discretion).
341. This kind of review would accord with statutory or administrative criteria such as those
empowering the Federal Labor Relations Authority to invalidate civil service awards that are "con-
trary to any law, rule, or regulation." 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(1) (1982).
342. Restricted by FAA standards, this function would not introduce impermissible levels of
bias.
343. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (noting that coercive applications of gov-
ernment power are more amenable to judicial review).
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federal programs suggests that a single characteristic should not
predominate.
Proposals are circulating that suggest employing arbitration in some
enforcement contexts, such as the revocation of permits for hazardous
waste facilities. 344 Such a scheme must contain certain limits. The exec-
utive traditionally enjoys wide prosecutorial discretion, because the com-
ponent activities of gathering information, setting priorities, and
allocating resources affect many of an agency's responsibilities and are
difficult to monitor effectively from the outside.345 Hence, permitting an
arbitrator to choose whom to prosecute or to decide other issues that
implicate general enforcement policy would divest the executive of core
functions.
Private neutrals could, however, play a number of other roles. First,
they could influence enforcement in ways that do not formally displace
executive discretion. A port:.on of the ACUS recommendation, for ex-
ample, suggests employing various ADR techniques, including negotia-
tion, mediation, and "minitrials," in the settlement of litigation. 346 These
techniques vest actual settlement authority in the hands of government
officers. The recommendation, however, would expose settlements rais-
ing major public policy issues or third-party effects to notice and com-
ment, thereby reaping the benefits of exposing deciders to outside
influences. 347 Thus, the process would not rely solely on interested par-
ties and the ADR neutral, whose perspective may be limited, in settling
cases having implications beyond their facts.
Second, private neutrals could arbitrate fact questions underlying an
enforcement dispute. Efficiency gains from informal process would ac-
crue without sacrificing the executive's needs to set overall enforcement
priorities and policy. This dnd of arbitration should be voluntary, to
alleviate concerns for both executive prerogative and fairness to affected
parties.
Finally, though the issue is more difficult, agencies could employ
private neutrals to arbitrate the application of settled criteria for sanc-
tions such as permit revocation to a particular respondent. The executive
344. See generally Holznagel, Negctiation and Mediation: The Newest Approach to Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting, 24 B.C. ENVTL. As'F. L. REV. 329 (1986) (discussing the success of various
state-law arbitration approaches in resolving waste facility disputes).
345. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (discussing wide-ranging agency prosecutorial discretion);
FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 249-50 (1967) (upholding FTC's discretion to deter-
mine whether to prosecute).
346. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1988). Minitrials are abbreviated summaries of trial evidence,
presented before principal officers of the litigants who are authorized to settle the case.
347. At present, consent agreements are sometimes subjected to notice and comment procedures.
See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & Fl. BRUFF, supra note 283, at 549.
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thereby retains control of overall policy by formulating the standards for
sanctions. But an important aspect of prosecutorial discretion concerns
law-applying-the decision whether to compromise a charge or to take it
to trial. Administrative law accommodates the combination of
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in a single agency, with appro-
priate safeguards.3 48 Nevertheless, reducing the potential for bias that
attends the selection of sanctions by the investigating office promotes due
process.3 49 Voluntary arbitration thus alleviates concerns for both execu-
tive and individual interests. As in other federal arbitration schemes, the
use of private deciders can promote public values.
VIII. Conclusion
To satisfy the due process and separation of powers concerns ema-
nating from articles II and III of the Constitution, arbitral schemes must
have certain relationships with federal courts and agencies. Agencies are
responsible for the composition of the arbitral pool, the method of select-
ing arbitrators in particular cases, and the articulation of the governing
norm. When arbitration does not have the full consent of private parties,
agencies have a special responsibility to assure its fairness by supervising
the conduct of arbitration in ways consistent with its neutrality. Agen-
cies must review awards in the limited ways that are familiar in private
arbitration, and also for their consistency with the agency's law and poli-
cies. Federal courts can then defer to agencies for review of individual
awards, while retaining their traditional function of deciding statutory
and constitutional challenges to the scheme as a whole.
Thus, the basic role of arbitration in federal programs is to apply
relatively well-defined public-law norms to factual disputes. Arbitration
can thereby promote goals of neutrality, expertise, informality, and expe-
dition in resolving these disputes. The policy effects of arbitration,
although inescapable, must be minimized through articulation of the
governing standard and review for the consistency of awards with the
agency's law and policy. Under appropriate constraints, private deciders
can play a role in the administration of public programs.
348. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 252 (1980) (holding that administrator acting as
prosecutor could make preliminary assessment of civil penalties that could become available to the
agency, with AUJ adjudicating the penalties).
349. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 492-93
(1976) (holding that school board could both negotiate with teachers and discharge them for illegally
striking after negotiations failed). In Hortonville, provision of a neutral decider would have elimi-
nated the need for the Court to inquire whether the facts raised a sufficient danger of bias to deny
due process.
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